University of Colorado Law School

Colorado Law Scholarly Commons
Articles

Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship

2011

Beyond Adjudication: Resolving International Resource Disputes
in an Era of Climate Change
Anna Spain
University of Colorado Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, Environmental Law Commons, International
Law Commons, and the Natural Resources Law Commons

Citation Information
Anna Spain, Beyond Adjudication: Resolving International Resource Disputes in an Era of Climate Change,
30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 343 (2011), available at https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles/190.

Copyright Statement

Copyright protected. Use of materials from this collection beyond the exceptions provided for in the Fair Use and
Educational Use clauses of the U.S. Copyright Law may violate federal law. Permission to publish or reproduce is
required.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship at Colorado Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Colorado Law
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lauren.seney@colorado.edu.

+(,121/,1(
Citation: 30 Stan. Envtl. L. J. 343 2011
Provided by:
William A. Wise Law Library

Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Tue Feb 28 14:55:45 2017
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from
uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
of your HeinOnline license, please use:
Copyright Information

Beyond Adjudication: Resolving
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of Climate Change
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In a time of war the law falls silent.
-Cicero
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I. INTRODUCTION

Climate change is one of the greatest emerging threats to
global peace and security.' Among other impacts, climate change
will exacerbate the scarcity of water, food, and other natural
resources essential to human survival. One concern is that as these
resources become scarcer, the frequency and severity of
international disputes will increase. Thus, developing effective
means for resolving international resource disputes is of critical
global importance.
Historically, the international legal system has played a central

1. See U.N. Secretary-General, Climate Change and Its Possible Secuity Implications, U.N.
Doc. A/64/350 at 1 (Sept. 11, 2009), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc
(discussing emerging
/UNDOC/GEN/NO9/509/46/PDF/NO950946.pdPOpenElement
climate change threats to global peace and security and noting that "there may be
implications for international cooperation from climate change's impact on shared or
undemarcated international resources"); Kofi Annan, As Climate Changes, Can We?, WASH.
POST, Nov. 8, 2006, at A27; Richard Ingham, Climate Change Is As Serious As WMD, AFP,
Nov. 15, 2006 (quoting Kofi Annan saying "[cilimate change is also a threat to peace and
security").
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role in providing international dispute resolution (IDR). 2 After
World War II (WWII), nations became obligated under the United
Nations (UN) Charter to pursue pacific dispute resolution as an
option of first recourse.3 Of the many methods provided for in the
Charter, adjudication has become the predominant approach for
dispute resolution under the international legal system. In recent
years, the use of adjudication has increased and international
courts and tribunals have proliferated.4 The normalization of
compulsory jurisdiction and the use of binding decision making
further supports this view.5
This Article challenges this paradigm and argues that the
emphasis on adjudication as a mechanism for resolving the types
of international disputes prompted by climate change is misplaced.
The examination of the limits of adjudication is not new to
2. For the purposes of this Article, International Dispute Resolution (IDR) refers to
the methods of dispute resolution (judicial settlement, arbitration, conciliation,
facilitation, negotiation, and mediation) utilized for assessing, preventing, managing, or
resolving disputes in the international context. For a comprehensive overview and
definition of individual methods, see JOHN COLLIER & VAUGHAN LOWE, THE SETILEMENTS
OF DisPuTEs IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 2-3 (2000).
3. See U.N. Charter art. 33, 1 1 ("The parties to any dispute, the continuance of
which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first
of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their
own choice.").
4. See Cesare P.R. Romano, The Shift from the Consensual to the Compulsory Paradigm in
InternationalAdjudication: Elements for a Theory of Consent, 99 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 791,
792-95 (2007) (discussing the shift toward compelling disputants to consent to the
jurisdiction of an international adjudicative body); Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferationof
InternationalJudicialBodies: The Piece of the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 709 (2000);
Andrea K. Schneider, Baigainingin the Shadow of (International)Law: What the Normalization
of Adjudication in InternationalGovernance Regimes Means for Dispute Resolution, 41 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L. L. & POL. 789, 793 (2009); Andrea Schneider, Not Quite a World Without Trials: Why
InternationalDispute Resolution Is Increasingly judicialized, 2006 J. Disp. RESOL. 119 (2006)
(discussing the increase in the use of trials to resolve international legal disputes).
5. See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, IntegratingInvestment Treaty Conflict and Dispute Systems
Design, 92 MINN. L. REv. 161, 201 (2007) ("The prevalence of arbitration provisions and
the apparent structural inclination towards arbitration indicate a presumption that
arbitration is the 'best' mechanism for resolving treaty disputes.") (footnote omitted);
Christopher Shen, InternationalArbitration and Enforcement in China: Historical Perspectives
and Current Trends, 14 CuRRENTs: INT'L TRADE L.J. 69, 70 (2005) (characterizing
arbitration as the "preferred method of international dispute resolution"); see also ABRAM
CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY. COMPLIANCE HTTH
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 202-07 (1995); Laurence Helfer & Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective SupranationalAdjudication, 107 Yale L.J., 273, 387
(1997); Eric A. Posner & John Yoo, A Theory of InternationalAdjudication (U. Chicago L. &
Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 206, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pape
rs.cfm?abstract id=507003.
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international legal scholarship. For example, Bilder discusses why,
due to the parties' reluctance to submit to the authority of a court,
the win-lose nature of the process, or the failure to address
underlying causes of the dispute, adjudication is limited in its
usefulness as an IDR method.6 Anand, Merrills, and others provide
additional reasons why states are reluctant to engage in an
adjudicatory process for resolving international disputes,
particularly those in which the stakes are high.7 Others have
described the limitations, as well as the benefits, of using
adjudication to resolve international environmental disputes,
which are addressed in Part III.B. 8
This Article extends the critique of adjudication to the context
of international resource disputes.9 The central claim is that
adjudication's limits render it ineffective as a tool for resolving
international resource disputes, warranting serious consideration
of alternative approaches. Adjudication is limited by process
deficiencies, its reliance on underdeveloped sources of
international law, and institutional restrictions. Analysis of the use
of adjudication by international courts and tribunals reveals four
categories of limitation: a) cases where the parties refused to
submit to adjudication, b) cases where the judicial decision did not
address the merits of the dispute, c) cases of noncompliance, and
d) cases with a recurrence of the dispute or conflict. In response, I
argue for progressing beyond the adjudication paradigm in order
to advance global capacity to resolve disputes and prevent conflict
in an era of climate change. I suggest that effective dispute
resolution can be enhanced through the use of integrated IDR
methods.1 0 Employing adjudication with mediation or facilitation

6. See Richard Bilder, Some Limitations of Adjudication As an International Dispute
Settlement Technique, 23 VA.J. INT'L L. 1, 4 (1982).
7. See generally R.P. ANAND, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION (1969); J.G.
Merrills, The Role and Limits of InternationalAdjudication, in INTERNATIONAL ILAW AND THE
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 169-81 (William E. Butler ed., 1987); G. Shinkaretskaya, The Present
and Future Role of InternationalAdjudication as a Means of Peacefully Settling Disputes, 29 INDIAN
J. INT'L L. 87 (1989).
8. See, e.g., CESARE P.R. ROMANO, THE PEACEFUL SETFLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES 91-129 (2000) (discussing the use of adjudication and judicial
settlement for international environmental disputes).
9. While these implications may apply to the adjudication of other types of
international disputes, demonstrating particular limitations in other areas is outside the
scope of this analysis.
10. See Anna Spain, IntegrationMatters: Rethinking the Architecture of InternationalDispnte
Resolution, 32 U. PA.J. INT'L L. 1 (2010).
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allows the strengths of rights-based processes and interest-based
processes to complement one another. Integrating different IDR
methods in this way has proven beneficial in international resource
cases, as three case studies illustrate, leading to the successful
resolution of disputes as well as to the deescalation of armed
conflict.
However, expanding IDR capacity beyond adjudication under
the international legal system raises broader conceptual issues
about the emerging purpose and scope of international law.
Solving global problems may require nations to comply with
international law, even when it is against their own interests, to
protect broader collective interests. This challenges fundamental
notions about the sovereignty, authority, and power of states.
Resolving international resource disputes, as this Article identifies,
requires recognizing the importance of including nonstate actors
in the process and having a reliable and effective system capable of
addressing all parties' concerns with legitimacy, fairness and speed.
Maintaining a system that limits the participation of nonstate
stakeholders in international decision-making hinders effective
dispute resolution.
As background for establishing the context and scope of this
Article, the following definitional and conceptual parameters
apply. First, the Article focuses on international disputes and their
resolution. However, it also recognizes the interconnected nature
between disputes and the conflicts those disputes are often part of.
In part, this is because resource scarcity and environmental
concerns are root causes of both disputes (over territory,
boundaries, etc.) and conflict. Definitions distinguishing the terms
"dispute," "conflict," "international," "armed," and so forth are
provided in Part II. Second, this Article narrows its examination of
adjudication to international resource disputes. I recognize that
the limitations of adjudication do extend to other types of
international and environmental disputes, but demonstrating such
is beyond the scope of this analysis. Third, the conceptual
framework for this Article examines the obstacles of using
adjudication in the context of international courts and tribunals.
Though adjudicatory mechanisms at the national and sub-national
levels, such as litigation in U.S. courts under the Alien Tort Statue,
provide additional mechanisms for resolving resource disputes,
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this Article does not analyze these mechanisms."
This Article proceeds in five Parts. The first Part analyzes the
relationship between climate change, resource scarcity, and
conflict. The second Part evaluates adjudication as a dispute
resolution mechanism for addressing international resource
disputes and identifies source and process limitations. The third
Part explores four categories of adjudication limitation:
nonparticipation, failure to address merits, noncompliance, and
recurrence. The fourth Part explains how adjudication could
improve through integration with interest-based IDR methods and
explores three case studies that illustrate this claim. And the fifth
Part considers how moving away from an adjudication-centric
model of dispute resolution will challenge the traditional
foundations of international law. The Article concludes by
emphasizing the importance of proactive preparation so that the
international legal system may serve as an effective tool for peace
in an era of climate change.
II. CLIMATE IN CRISIS: WILL THERE BE WAR?
Climate change and - adjudication are connected in the
following way: While we cannot predict exactly how climate change
will impact the future world order, we do know that it will. One
concern is that climate change will present conditions that will
intensify the onset of conflict. For international law to assist in the
promotion of global peace and security in this new era, it must be
prepared to provide effective tools for tempering human
inclinations to resort to force in times of crisis.' 2 This Article
evaluates the international legal system's ability to do so through
adjudication. This section describes the link between climate
11. See, e.g., Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948) (allowing aliens to
bring torts that violate "the law of nations" or a "treaty of the United States" before U.S.
courts); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (in which the Supreme Court
holds that ATS suits arising from breaches in customary international law are permissible);
Richard Herz, Litigating Environrmental Abuses Under the Alien Tort Claims Act: A Practical
Assessment, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 545 (2000) (explaining how ATS suits may arise from the
breach of a treaty obligation); Kathleen Jaeger, Environmental Claims Ulnder the Alien Tart
Statute, 28 BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 519 (2010) (noting that although pre-Sosa U.S. courts have
addressed several international environmental cases including Rares v. South Peru Coppe;
Coip., 343 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2003), Aguidan v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002),
Beanal v. Freepai-McMoran,Inc., 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999), }ota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d
153 (2d Cir. 1998), Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668, (S.D.N.Y. 1991), they
have not been successful).
12. PEACE AND CONFLICr 2008 21 U. Joseph Hewitt et al. eds., 2007).
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change, resource scarcity, and conflict to explain how climate
change will have an impact on the future of international dispute
resolution.
A. Climate Change, Resource Scarcity, and Conflict
Climate change will likely cause significant changes in the
supply and distribution of the world's natural resources. Coupled
with increased global demand from a growing human population,
this presents conditions for conflict for obvious reasons-natural
resources are essential to human survival' 3-making
climate
change a serious threat to global peace and security.' 4
In 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) concluded that the planet is warming. The Earth is warmer
than it was in 1860 by approximately .75 0 C and the years between
1995 and 2006 were eleven of the twelve warmest on record.15
Scientists concur that most of the warming over the last 50 years is
due to human activity,' 6 primarily the consumption of fossil fuels
and deforestation, which are the core drivers of increased
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. 7 Furthermore, impacts are
occurring more quickly than originally predicted. Warming of the
oceans is causing ice sheets to melt rapidly and existing seawater to
expand.' 8 Sea-level rise could reach thirteen to sixteen feet, which
would inundate small island States, coastal cities, and low-lying

13. See, e.g., Steve Lonergan, Water Resource and Conflict: Examples from the Middle East,
in CONFLICT AND THE ENVIRONMENT 375 (Nils Petter Gleditsch et al. eds., 1997)
(discussing the essential nature of water to human survival).
14. See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 1 (discussing emerging climate change
threats to global peace and security).
15. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Summary for Policymakers, in
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP
I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE

CHANGE 10 (Solomon, et al. eds., 2007), available at www.ipcc.ch/publications-and data/
ar4/wgl/en/spm.html.
16. Id. at 5 (reporting measurements for global surface temperature since 1850).
17. Id. at 2 (reporting that C02 emissions are primarily caused by human
consumption of fossil fuels; emissions of methane and nitrous oxide are primarily caused
by agricultural activity and deforestation). On average, C02 emissions are increasing at 7.2
GTC per year in 2000-2005, up from 6.4 GTC per year in the 1990s. Id.
18. Id. at 5 (noting that global average sea level rise is speeding tip. It rose at an
average rate of 1.8 mm per year from 1961-2003 and 3.1 mm from 1993-2003); id. at 15
(finding that late-summer arctic ice sheets are expected to disappear by the end of this
century, that arctic sea ice has been decreasing by 2.7% per decade, and the arctic ice melt
has experienced a 40% loss since 1980).
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countries like Bangladesh.' 9
As the climate warms and changes, it will alter the location and
availability of the world's freshwater resources. Presently, over 1.4
billion people lack access to safe water and 76% of the world's
population lives in water-stressed areas. 20 By mid-century, the IPCC
predicts that overall fresh water supplies will decline as storage in
.glaciers and snow cover disappears.2' Water scarcity in Africa is of
particular concern as, according to some estimates, most of its
regions will face water shortages by as early as 2030.22
Environmental degradation, pollution and poor management
practices compound these effects. 23
The impact climate change will have on the global food supply
is equally troubling. Crop yields and food production will likely
decrease while extreme weather events and disease increase.24
Impacts will be global, cumulative, and irreversible in nature.25
Some regions will face more difficulty than others. Sub-Saharan
Africa, for example, can expect significant reductions in
agricultural output due to shorter growing seasons and drought.
This will likely result in $14 billion in annual costs to the
agriculture sector, with overall global annual cost estimated at
$171 billion.2 6
Given this future scenario, the international community has
begun to explore security risks, placing climate change on the

19. Id. at 9.
20. JEROME DELLI PRISCOLI & AARON WOLF, MANAGING AND TRANSFORMING WATER
CONFLICTS xxii (2009).
21.

IPCC, supra note 15, at 11.

22. U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE REPORT, CLIMATE CHANGE:
IMPACrS, VULNERABILITIES AND ADAPTATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 18-19 (2007).

23. Nils Petter Gleditsch, Armed Conflict and the Environment, in ENVIRONMENTAL
CONFLICT 257-58 (Paul F. Diehl and Nils Petter Gleditsch, eds.) (2001).
24. IPCC, supra note 15, at 12.
25. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, PRESENTATION AT PRE-COP
IN WARSAW: 20TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
(2008), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/presentations/pre-cop-warsaw-2-10-2008/preswarsaw-climate%20-botagaj- 1.pdf.
26. Climate Change Cost Estimates Ilzwed, Study Says, IRIN HUMANITARIAN NEWS AND
ANALYSIS, Sept. 1, 2009, availableat http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=85946

(reporting that the UNFCCC committee of scientists estimating impacts from 2002-08, led
by Martin Perry, estimated that annual sector costs as a result of warming temperatures will
reach $14 billion for agriculture; $11 billion for water; $5 billion for human health; $11
billion for coastal zones; and $130 billion for infrastructure, reaching an annual total of
$171 billion in costs; and noting that Perry argues that these estimates err on the low side
because of the short time-frame in which the study was produced).
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national security agenda in the U.S. and in other countries.2 7 One
concern is that resource scarcity, in addition to other impacts, will
lead to war.28 Historically, competition over natural resources has
contributed to the onset of international conflict.29 States resort to
armed conflict over threats to their sovereignty, territory, and
national security,3 0 which sometimes involve underlying disputes
about the use or ownership of natural resources.3 ' For example, a
border dispute between two countries can escalate into armed
conflict when nations send armed troops to border regions where
local populations are struggling to exert control over a natural
resource.32 In other instances internal demand for scarce resources
drives expansion, increasing the potential for armed conflict as
populations migrate across national borders.3 3
International armed conflict and international environmental
disputes over natural resources are often interconnected as both
are born out of common underlying issues. Even so, each term

27. S.C. Res. 1625, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1625 (Sept. 14, 2005) (addressing threats to
international peace and security at the Security Council Summit); see, e.g., A Bad Climate for
Development, ECONOMIST, Sept. 17, 2009; Bryan Bender, Bill Ties Climate to NationalSecurity,
B. GLOBE, Apr. 9, 2007; Joshua Busby, Who Cares About the Weather? Climate Change and U.S.
NationalSecurity, 17 SECURITY STUD. 468 (2008).
28. For extended definitions and discussion of natural resource scarcity, see THOMAS
see also
HOMER-DIXON, ENVIRONMENT, SCARCITY AND VIOLENCE 47-52 (1999);
ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT 257-72, 320 (Paul Diehl & Nils Petter Gleditsch eds., 2001)
(discussing nine common problems with research on scarcity and conflict).
29. Cesare P.R. Romano, InternationalDispute Settlement, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 1037 (Dan Bodansky,Jutta Brunnee & Ellen Hey

eds., 2007) (referring to American University's Inventory of Conflict and the Environment,
which indicates at least 120 international disputes or conflicts prompted by environmental
issues), available at http://wwwl.american.edu/TED/ice/ice.htm.
30. JACOB BERCOVITCH & JUDITH FRETTER, REGIONAL GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICT AND MANAGEMENT FROM 1945-2003 13 (2004).
31. Id.; see ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT, supra note 28, at 256; see also RONGXING GUO,
TERRITORIAL DISPUTES AND RESOURCES MANAGEMENT A GLOBAL HANDBOOK xiii-12 (2007)

(providing case studies documenting boundary and territory resource disputes around the
world since WWII through a survey of nearly 200 "disputed areas"). Guo presents a short
narrative of the causes and consequences of each dispute and the subsequent conflict
resolution efforts (xiii-xiv); offers various definitions of boundary including natural
features (mountain, river, lake, sea or other water body) (3-4); supports the idea that
resource scarcity and territorial disputes are linked (9); and lists approaches "successfully
applied to the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes as well as to the management of
natural and environmental resources in disputed areas." (12).
32. See, e.g., Frontier Dispute (Mali v. Burk. Faso), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 554 (Dec.
22).
33. GUo, supra note 31, at 9 (suggesting that internal demands on resources cause
expansion and increase likelihood of conflicts arising from "hostile lateral pressure").
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enjoys a distinct definition. The generally accepted definition of
conflict is violent or armed contact between two or more groups
resulting in a certain threshold of death and casualties over a
sustained period of time.34 Traditionally, international conflict was
defined as occurring between two or more states (interstate), with
the classic scenario being described as war.35 However, this
definition has been expanded to include other types of conflict
that pose a threat to global peace and security. Today,
international conflicts include armed conflict between groups
within a state (intrastate) further defined as civil, regional-internal,
and inter-communal,3 6 and between groups that are not states or
their objects (nonstate) 37 when there is a spillover effect, regional
proliferation, the threat or use of nuclear, biological, or chemical
weapons, or the finding of international war crimes.3 8 Thus, the
traditional understanding of international conflict as a war that
occurs between nations has expanded to embrace the
understanding that civil wars and regional nonstate wars can
become international conflicts when they rise to the level of
threatening international peace and security. International
disputes are distinguished from conflict by their limited violence
and are generally defined as "specific disagreement[s] concerning
a matter of fact, law, or policy in which a claim or assertion of one
party is met with refusal, counter-claim, or denial by another." 39
Despite the severity of the potential threat that climate change
presents for global peace and security, scholars are cautious about
confirming a direct causal relationship between resource scarcity
and the onset of international conflict. 40 On one side of the
debate, scholars argue that scarcity of critical resources does drive
people to conflict.4' Empirical studies show that incidents of
34. MEREDITH REID SARKEES & FRANK WHELON WAYMAN, RESORT TO WAR 46-60

(2010).
35. Id. at 61-62.
36. Id. at 64.
37. I at 70:
38. BERCOVITCH & FRETTER, supra note 30, at 7-8, 13.
39. J.G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DIsPUTE SEYrLEMENT 1 (2005).
40. See Ragnhild Nordas & Nils Petter Gleditsch, Climate Change and Conflict, 26 POL.
GEOG. 627, 627-38 (2007) (calling for better coupling of climate change and conflict
models and increased specificity about the types of expected violence); Idean Salehyan,
From Climate Change to Conflict? No Consensus Yet, 45 J. PEACE REs. 3, 315 (2008).
41. See HOMER-DIXON, supra note 28, at 166-68 (discussing why scarcity can
contribute to violent conflict in the intra-state context and that these conditions are likely
to increase in the future). See generallyJAMES LEE, CLIMATE CHANGE AND ARMED CONFLICT
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conflict increase significantly when there is a large or rapid change
to an ecosystem or political setting and when existing governance
structures cannot effectively manage that change. 42 Homer-Dixon
argues that interstate wars over water are possible but unlikely and
such conflicts are more likely to be intrastate than interstate.4 3
Gleditsch argues that resource scarcity is a "traditional source of
armed conflict"44 and interstate wars "but less so than political or
economic variables." 45 The Inventory of Conflict and the
Environment database provides additional evidence that there are
linkages between the availability of natural resources and conflict
between nations.4 6
On the other hand, those that reject this view argue that
because scarcity is not the only factor that will increase the risk of
violent conflict, it cannot be evaluated in such an absolute
manner. 47 Far from causing conflict, some even argue that certain
types of resource scarcity increase international cooperation 8 or
that resource abundance, rather than scarcity, is more likely to
cause conflict.49
Those representing the view from the global South reframe the
debate and claim that industrialization, the global trade regime,
over-consumption and developed countries' interests in resources,
(2009).
42. PRISCOLI & WOLF, supra note 20, at 19 (citing the Transboundary Freshwater
Disputes Database study of 2006).
43. Thomas Homer-Dixon, Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from
Cases, 19 INT'L SECURITY 1, 540 (1994). But see ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT 263-65 (Paul
Diehl & Nils Petter Gleditsch eds., 2001) (arguing that resource scarcity can lead to
cooperation).
44. Nils Petter Gleditsch, Environmental Conflict and the Democratic Peace, 33 CONFL. &
ENV'T. 91 (1997).
45. Dichl & Gleditsch, supra note 28, at 256.
46. INVENTORY

OF CONFLICr AND

THE ENVIRONMENT,

AMERICAN

UNIVERSITY,

available at http://wwwl.american.edu/TED/ice/ice.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2011).
47. Diehl & Gleditsch, supra note 28, at 317; see alsoJON BARNETT & W. NEIL ADGER,
Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict 26 POL. GEOG. 639, 644 (2007).
48. PRISCOLI & WOLF, supra note 20, at 19, 21-23 (arguing that since parties generally
recognize that water is too important to fight about they are more likely to respond with
cooperative behavior than with conflict); see also BRIDGES OVER WATER: UNDERSTANDING
TRANSBOUNDARY WATER CONFLICT, NEGOTIATION AND COOPERATION (Ariel Dinar et al.
eds., 2007) (concurring with this perspective).
49. Diehl & Gleditsch, supra note 28, at 257 (citing Indra de Soysa's study finding
empirical support that resource abundance in least developed nations is more likely to
lead to civil war than resource scarcity); see also Simon Dalby, Geopolitical Knowledge: Scale,
Method, and the "Willie Sutton Syndrome," 12 GEOPOL. 183, 183-91 (2007); Salehyan, supra
note 40, at 316 n.1 (2008).
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not scarcity, are the acute environmental threat and subsequent
causal factor driving conflict for developing countries.5 0 They also
stress that the poorest people of the world have the least adaptive
capacity,5 1 and this magnifies their vulnerability to scarcity and
conflicts. 5 2
III. EVALUATING ADJUDICATION AS A MECHANISM FOR RESOLVING
DISPUTES
If international disputes over natural resources are going to
occur, how will the international legal system address them? The
UN Charter obligates states to resolve their disputes peacefully and
lists several dispute resolution methods that states may employ.5 3
Of these, adjudication has been the primary method of dispute
resolution provided for by the international legal system.54
Adjudication is generally defined as the resolution of legal disputes
on the basis of international law by the process of arbitration or

50. Narottam Gaan, Environment and Conflict: The South's Perspective, 28 STRAT. ANAL.
827, 832-33 (1995).
51. IPCC, supra note 15, at 21 (defining adaptive capacity as the ability of a system to
adjust to climate change (including climate variability and extremes) to moderate
potential damages, to take advantage of opportunities, or to cope with the consequences).
Vulnerability is the degree to which a system is susceptible to, and unable to cope with,
adverse effects of climate change, including climate variability and extremes. Vulnerability
is a function of the character, magnitude, and rate of climate change and variation to
which a system is exposed, its sensitivity, and its adaptive capacity. Id. See also SIMON DALBY,
ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY 51 (2002) (discussing the results of Gunther Baechler's
"ENCOP" project "finding that states with the lowest HDI's had the highest proneness to
warfare").
52.

See THIRD WORLD ATITrUDES TOWARD INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION

(Frederick Snyder & Surakiart Sathirathai eds., 1987); Guo, supra note 31, at 9 (arguing
that population growth and high per-capita resource consumption cause environmental
degradation and scarcity, which, when coupled with structural unequal access to resources,
increases the chance of violence); Gaan, supra note 50, at 832-33.
53. See U.N. Charter pmbl., I 1 (noting peace and international security as a
common goal of participating states); U.N. Charter art. 2, 1 3 ("All Members shall settle
1 ("The
their international disputes by peaceful means . . . ."); U.N. Charter art. 33,
parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security, shall first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry,
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or
arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.").
54. See generally Philippe Sands, Intaroduclion, in RUTH MACKENZIE ET AL., THE
MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS at ix, xi-xiii (2d ed. 2010) (discussing
the emergence of adjudication as the primary form of IDR, the rise of international
adjudicatory bodies, the increasing roles of non-state actors in international disputes, and
the corresponding increase in international litigation).
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judicial settlement.55 This section evaluates the role that
adjudication serves as a dispute resolution mechanism by reviewing
its developmental history and scholarly criticisms, and examining
issues arising from source and process limitations in a variety of
international courts and tribunals.
A. The Development of Adjudication
The development of adjudication as a form of international
dispute settlement began with arbitration.5 6 Arbitration offered
parties a process for settling disputes by referring them to ad-hoc
bodies responsible for issuing legally binding decisions. 57 In 1899,
twenty-eight states adopted the Convention for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes to "ensure the pacific
settlement of international differences"5 8 and established the
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA).59 The PCA is an
intergovernmental organization that serves as an arbitral
institution empowered with the ability to conduct arbitration,
conciliation, and fact-finding.60 After WWII, the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) (replacing the Permanent Court of Justice)
was formed as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations to
offer judicial settlement through a standing tribunal with
permanent judges. 61
Today, many nations use adjudication to address their
international disputes over natural resources and other
55. J.G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETrLEMENT 91, 127 (2005) (discussing
arbitration and judicial settlement, respectively); see alo ROMANO, supra note 8, at 91.
56. See DANIEL TERRIS ET AL., THE INTERNATIONALJUDGE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
MEN AND WOMEN WHO DECIDE THE WORLD'S CASES 1-4 (2007) (providing a historical
account of the development of international arbitration); see-alvo Sands, sup'ra note 54, at xxi (describing four phases of the development of international adjudication).
57. MERRILLS, supra note 39, at 91.
58. 1899 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes art. 1, 32
Stat. 1779 (1901), available at www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/1899ENG.pdf; see Sands,
supra note 54, at ix (noting that the Convention "marked a turning point in favor of
international adjudication before standing bodies").
59. See Sands, supra note 54, at ix (describing the formation of the PCA as the first
standing body for international adjudication); TERRIS ET AL., supra note 56, at 2-3
(describing the creation and structure of the PCA).
60. About Us, PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, http://www.pca-cpa.org/show
page.asp?pag-id=1027 (last visited Feb. 8, 2011).
61.

The Court, INTERNATIONAL

COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-cij.org/court/

index.php?pl=1 (last visited Feb. 8, 2011); see also RUTH MACKENZIE ET AL., THE MANUAL
ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 4-5 (2d ed. 2010) (discussing the formation
and organizational structure of the ICJ).
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environmental issues. 6 2 Adjudication is appealing because it offers
certainty of process, legitimacy and a binding outcome that enjoys
the promise of compliance under international law. Judges and
arbitrators promote dispute resolution by developing a common
understanding of facts and clarifying substantive rules of law.63
While States have historically not preferred adjudication as a
mechanism for resolving environmental and other complex
disputes, 64 the increased number of cases before the International
Court ofJustice, Permanent Court of Arbitration, the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS,) and other venues, and
the prevalence of dispute resolution measures in international
environmental treaties suggests otherwise today.65 This coincides
with the general trend toward compulsory jurisdiction, the use of
binding forms of decision-making, and the proliferation of
international courts and tribunals in international law. 66 Thus,
adjudication has become the central form of dispute resolution
under the international legal system today.67
62. ROMANO, supra note 8, at 91-92; TIM STEPHENS, INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 21-62 (2009).
63.

See ANDREW T. GUzMAN, How INTERNATIONAL LAw WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE

THEORY at 51-53 (2008) (discussing the role that international courts play as an
"information mechanism").
64. See Richard Bilder, The Settlement of Disputes in the Field of the InternationalLaw ofthe
Environment, 144 RECUEIL DES COURS 139, 228 (1975); Stephen J. Toope, Funnality and
Informality, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW at 109

(arguing that "courts, and even other forms of third party adjudication, play a relatively
minor role in international law generally and in environmental law in particular").
65. See STEPHENS, snupra note 62, at 21 (noting that although adjudication was rarely
used in early international environmental disputes, it has become routine in recent
decades).
66. See CESARE P.R. ROMANO, THE PROJECT ON COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, THE
INTERNATIONAL JUDICIARY IN CONTEXT: A SYNOPTIC CHART (2004), available at

http://www.pict-pcti.org/publications/synoptic-chart/synop-c4.pdf (providing a graphic
and textual overview of the expansion of international courts, tribunals, and other judicial
bodies); Cesare P.R. Romano, The Shift from the Consensual to the Compulsoy Paradigm in
InternationalAdjudication: Elements for a Thery of Consent, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 791,
792-95 (2007) (discussing the shift toward compelling disputants to consent to the
jurisdiction of an international adjudicative body); Sands, supra note 54, at xiii (noting the
trend toward inclusion of binding dispute resolution methods in treaties, including the
1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 1994 World Trade Organization
Dispute Settlement Understanding).
67. See Susan D. Franck, Integrating Investment Treaty Conflict and Dispute Systems
Design, 92 MINN. L. REV. 161, 201 (2007) ("The prevalence of arbitration provisions and
the apparent structural inclination towards arbitration indicate a presumption that
arbitration is the 'best' mechanism for resolving treaty disputes.") (footnote omitted);
Andrea K. Schneider, Bargainingin the Shadow of (International)Law: What the Normalization
of Adjudication in International Governance Regimes Meansfor Dispute Resolution, 41 N.Y.U. J.
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B. LiteratureReview

The idea that adjudication is inadequate and, more specifically,
fails to resolve disputes,6 8 is not new. Scholars have claimed that
adjudication is ineffective at resolving international disputes on
several grounds: because states are reluctant to submit to a thirdparty decision-making authority;6 9 because the nature of the
adjudication process is zero-sum; because judicial decisions often
ignore underlying issues in the dispute; and because States "have
little incentive to resort to international adjudication as a way of
clarifying or developing general rules."70 Adjudicatory forums are
generally limited in the kinds of cases that they can hear, which, to
be justiciable, must be framed as a legal dispute even when there
are other issues at stake." The ICJ, for example, has been reluctant
to offer legal decisions that cross into political matters.72 Judicial
proceedings are also retroactive, do not tend to proactively prevent
harms from occurring and, instead, offer remedies that cannot
compensate for the true value of the loss. 73
Scholars also consider why adjudication fails to adequately
resolve international environmental disputes. For example, Bilder
argues that adjudication is less effective than non-judicial,
collaborative methods of IDR for resolving international
INT'L. L. & POL. 789, 793 (2009) ("[D]isputes are more likely than ever to be resolved

through a trial or adjudicatory method."); Christopher Shen, International Arbitration and
Enforcement in China: Historical Perspectives and Current Trends, 14 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE
L.J. 69, 70 (2005) (characterizing arbitration as the "preferred method of international

dispute resolution").
68. JOHN COLLIER

& VAUGHAN

INTERNATIONAL LAw 1-2 (1999)

LOWE,

THE

SETTLEMENT OF

DISPUTES

IN

(noting that settlement implies that the parties to the

dispute accept the adjudicatory authority's outcome that decides the dispute, often in
favor of one side or another, based upon the application of the facts to the law; whereas
resolution implies that the parties have not only settled the legal matter, they have also
resolved the underlying issues giving rise to the dispute in the first place).
69. Richard Bilder, International Dispute Settlement and the Role of International
Adjudication, I EMORYJ. INT'L DISP. RESOL. 131, 151-61 (1987).
70.

Bilder, supra note 6, at 5.

71.

HERSCH

LAUTERPACHT,

THE

FUNCTION

OF

LAW

IN

THE

INTERNATIONAL

COMMUNITY 158 (1933); ROMANO, supra note 8, at 91.
72. CESARE P.R. ROMANO, THE SWORD AND THE SCALES 72-79 (2009); DAVID
SCHWEIGMAN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE UN

CHARTER 261 (2001) ("According to the 'political question doctrine,' the Court should
and could not pronounce on certain aspects of a case because these questions relate to the
political sphere.").
73. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, 266 (July 8) (finding that the threat alone constituted a remediable action; the
harm did not have to have occurred).
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environmental disputes because states are reluctant to hand their
control over such cases to a court or tribunal.7 4 Bilder also argues
that adjudication is of limited use in resolving environmental
disputes because the issues are technically complex and politically
sensitive.7 5 Romano argues that in such cases, issues are often
fragmented into distinct legal matters and channeled into separate
forums that isolate related interests and actors.76 Fitzmaurice
identifies the lack of standing for nonstate actors, particularly
NGOs, as a prominent reason why the ICJ is an ineffective venue
for the resolution of international environmental disputes.77
International resource disputes commonly involve nonstate parties
who are not able to fully participate in international adjudication
processes.7 8 Such disputes also raise collective public interests,
which call for the participation of civil society in the resolution
process.79 There can also be norm conflict between the goals of a
court and tribunal and the environmental goals of the disputants.8 0
Further studies on the resolution of international water
disputes support the claim that adjudication is an inadequate
process for achieving resolution. Like Bilder and Romano, Graffey
suggests that adjudication is of limited value in this context
because States are reluctant to relinquish control over the
outcome to a court or tribunal.8 1 Brunnee and Toope identify the
tendency of the adjudicatory regime to falsely shape water
problems into ones over territory and sovereignty.8 2 Bourne
explains how adjudication can "petrify the status quo," which is

74.
75.
76.
77.

Bilder, supra note 6, at 3-5, 9-10; see also ROMANO, supra note 8.
Bilder, supra note 6, at 180.
ROMANO, supra note 8, at 1045-54.
Malgosia Fitzmaurice, The I.C]. and Environmental Disputes, in INTERNATIONAL

LAWAND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 51-52 (French, Saul, & White eds., 2010).

78. See, e.g., Peggy Kalas, InternationalEnvironmentalDispute Resolution and the Need for
Access by Nonstate Entities, 12 COLO.J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 191, 193 (2001) (discussing
the lack of nonstate actor participation in international courts).
79. Neil Craik, Recalcitrant Reality and Chosen Ideals: The Public Function of Dispute
Settlement in InternationalEnvironmentalLaw, 10 GEO. INT'L EN\TL. L. REV. 551 (1998).
80. John Martin Gillroy, Adjudication Norms, Dispute Settlement Regimes, and
International Tribunals: The Status of "Environmental Sustainability" in International
jurisprudence,42 STAN.J. INT'L L. 1 (2006).
81. Colleen P. Graffy, Water, Water, Everywhere, nor Any Drop to Dhink: The Urgency of
TransnationalSolutions to InternationalRipatian Disputes, 10 GEO. INT'L ENinL. L. REv. 399
(1998).
82. Jutta Brunnee & Stephen J. Toope, Environmental Security and FreshwaterResources:
Ecosystem Regime Building,91 AM.J. INT'L L. 26, 37 (1997).
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often an inadequate outcome for a resource that is dynamic in
nature.83 The lengthy and costly process of adjudication, which is
aimed at remedy and not prevention, fails to provide adequate
relief to the parties in conflict. Instead, processes that can be used
during earlier stages of a conflict offer superior results.
C. Source Challenges
A fundamental challenge to the process of adjudicating
disputes is finding appropriate and well-defined sources of law
upon which to base judicial decisions. When the law is poorly
developed, it can be difficult for courts and tribunals to provide
decisions that resolve disputes on their merits. 84 This is a challenge
for the resolution of disputes involving environmental issues for
several reasons. First, there is little consensus about the definition
of international environmental disputes,8 5 making it difficult to
distinguish sources of environmental law from general
international law. Second, international law is not well developed
in many areas that are essential for judicial decision making on
environmental matters. One example is the lack of legal protection
for harms affecting global common areas-the atmosphere for
instance-that do not otherwise directly affect the legal rights or
interests of any one particular state.8 6 Many disputes arising out of
climate change will raise issues not yet developed in international
law, particularly those dealing with protecting scarce resources that
belong to the international community as a whole.
When considering environmental issues in cases, judges and
arbitrators must also deal with the special international legal
character of environmental norms.8 7 Environmental disputes raise
83. C.B. Bourne, Mediation, Conciliation, and Adjudication in the Settlement of
InternationalDrainageBasin Disputes,9 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 114, 139-40 (1971).
84. See, e.g., Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 74 (Sept.
25) (recognizing the special nature of environmental protection in requiring prevention
and in the limitations of traditional reparations).
85. Romano (2000), supra note 4, at 13-29 (discussing variations on definitions of the
terms "international," "dispute," and "environment").
86. See generally Alan E. Boyle, Remedying Harm to International Common Spaces and
Resources: Compensation and Other Approaches, in HARM TO THE ENVIRONMENT: THE RIGHT
TO COMPENSATION AND THE ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES 83 (Peter Wetterstein ed., 1997);

Tullio Scovazzi, State Responsibility for Environmental Harm, 12 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 43
(2001).
87. For a comprehensive treatment of this issue, see Int'l Law Comm'n, Report on
State Responsibility, 11 82-119, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/507 (Mar. 15, 2000) (prepared by James
Crawford).
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concerns about international law's ability to prevent harms and
provide adequate remedies. 88 They also present doctrinal
challenges with regard to standing, legal interest, and injury.8 9 For
example, how should courts treat environmental claims that are
not bilateral? Article .48 of the Rules on State Responsibility
supports erga omnes,9 0 or allowing "an injured State to invoke the
responsibility of another State if the obligation breached is owed to
. . . a group of States including that State, or the international
community as a whole" and, in this way, states may elect to trigger
a form of actio popularis complaint for an environmental matter.9 1
This permits states to seek protection and claim remedies for
harms to the environment not because the harm directly impacts
that state, but because it impacts the international community as a
whole. 92 However, in practice, there is limited support that these
principles have been accepted as customary international law.93
Treaties, as the main source of international environmental
law, offer another basis for court decisions. The difficulty with
treaties as a source is that they require explicit state consent and
therefore specific provisions that address sensitive issues are
difficult to reach.9 4 Stringent standards that achieve environmental
protection are often sacrificed to attain increased participation.95
As a result, provisions can be vague, leading to confusion about
questions of breach or enforcement.96 For example, the United

88. Fitzmaurice, supra note 77, at 18-19.
89. IdL
90. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts art. 48, G.A. Res. 56/83,
Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Dec. 12, 2001).
91. Id. at art. 42; see, e.g, Nuclear Tests (Austi. v. Fr.) 1974 I.C.J. 253 (Dec. 20);
Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J.457 (Dec. 20); see also STEPHENS, supra note 62, at 67
(describing the relationship between the ILC's treatment, customary international law,
and the ICJ's treatment of erga omnes for environmental harms); CHRISTIAN J. TAMS,
ENFORCING OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 27 (2005).
92. SeeJAMES CRAWFORD, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS AN OPEN SYSTEM 341-59 (2002).

93. See, e.g., Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain) (second
phase) 1970 I.C.J. 3, 33 (Feb. 5) (noting the existence of general obligations for
prohibition on acts of aggression, genocide, slavery, and racial discrimination).
94. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION
AFTER THE COLD WAR 263 (Paul C. Stern & Daniel Druckman eds., 2000) (evaluating why
international agreements on world agricultural prices are difficult to reach).
95. See STEPHENS, supra note 62, at 63 (discussing the dangers of weakened
environmental laws and how partial compliance with tough laws can lead to better
protection than full compliance with less stringent laws).
96. For a discussion about enforcement challenges, see Kal Raustiala, Fonn and
Substance in InternationalAgreements, 99 AM.J. INT'L L. 581 (2005).
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Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
International
Watercourses,
which
offers
comprehensive
protection for transboundary watercourses, has not yet entered
into force.9 7 It calls for equitable and reasonable use, cooperation,
exchange of information, and duty not to cause significant harm,
but fails to clarify what constitutes an appreciable harm under the
treaty.98 Treaties have also overemphasized enforcement and
compliance as a proxy for substantive achievement.9 9 For example,
under the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, parties
have the power to suspend the operation of a multilateral treaty
with a breaching party upon proving that a material breach
occurred. 00 However, this is difficult to do and largely ineffective
for the purposes of enforcing environmental protection. 0
Despite these limitations, environmental
treaties are
increasingly common and many provide their own dispute
resolution regimes. 0 2 Consequently, as parties utilize these
mechanisms, they are minimizing the role that general
international
courts serve in
adjudicating
international

97. Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of Int'l Watercourses, 27
U.N.T.S. 12 (May 21, 1997), available at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src
=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg no=XXVII-12&chapter=27&lang=en#Participants;
see
also AARON SCHWABACH, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTEs 88-89 (2006)
(noting that the Convention was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1997 by a vote of
103 for, 3 against, 27 abstentions, and 33 absent).
98. Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of Int'l Watercourses, General
Assembly, Verbatim records of plenary meeting No. 99, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/51/PV.99 (May
21, 1997), available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/viewdoc.asp ?symbol= A/51/PV.99;
see also STEPHEN MCCAFFREY, CONVENTION ON THE LAw OF NON-NAVIGATIONAL
USES
OF
INTERNATIONAL
WATERCOURSES
(1997),
available
at
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/ciniiw/ clnuiw.html (describing the Convention).
99. STEPHENS, supra note 62, at 63-64 (arguing that focusing on compliance at the
cost of achieving effective environmental outcomes is problematic and therefore the focus
on norm enforcement over norm generation can be misplaced).
100. International Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Law of Treaties, G.A. Res.
2166 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 1484th plen. mtg., at 60(2), U.N. Doc. A/Res/2166
(Dec. 5, 1966).
101. STEPHENS, supra note 62, at 70 (noting that in the Cabcikovo-Nagymaros Project
case the ICJ did not find that there was enough of a breach to warrant suspension or
exclusion and that Japan's expulsion from the 1946 International Convention for the
Regulation of Whaling did not remedy its breach (hunting whales despite the moratorium
on commercial whaling) and instead likely resulted in nonregulation of its further whaling
activities).
102. See, e.g., Intervention on the High Seas Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1471-87 (2011)
(drafted pursuant to the International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High
Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties).
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environmental disputes. 0 3 In part, this can be attributed to the
development of judicial features in environmental treaty regimes
supplanting the need for general protections through state
responsibility and judicial settlement bodies. However, there is
growing concern that international environmental law cannot and
should not be separated from general international law.10 4 As
environmental disputes become more common in an era of
climate change, the need to appreciate their special character and
their interconnectivity with issues of general international law will
grow. Courts and tribunals may need to consider new sources of
law or interpret existing sources in new ways to provide effective
dispute resolution through adjudication in the future.
D. Process Challenges
Adjudication, as a process of dispute resolution, has several
obstacles that limit its effectiveness for resolving international
resource disputes.105 First, adjudication generally prohibits or
restricts the participation of nonstate parties through jurisdiction
and standing requirements. 1 06 Second, adjudication is not
designed to address extra-legal issues, which are common to
complex, multi-issue international resource disputes.10 7 Third,
adjudication is retroactive. It is not designed to prevent harms
from occurring but rather to address harms once they have
occurred. Because environmental harms, not to mention the cost
of conflicts arising out of them, are often irreparable, adjudication
is not an adequate process to address situations that require
prevention or management. Fourth, the remedies available
through adjudication are limited and often inadequate. Fifth,
103. See STEPHENS, supra note 62, at 64 (arguing that the trend toward treaty-based
dispute settlement in international environmental cases has sidelined the "general
machinery of international law" developed by international courts of general jurisdiction
and describing how the reduction of referrals to the ICJ is a consequence of the rise in
environmental treaties and treaty-based compliance mechanisms).
104. See Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots. v. Namib.), 1999 I.C.J. 1045 (Dec. 13)
(arguing that environmental considerations about ecosystems should be taken into
account in boundary delimitation).
105. See generally ANAND, supra note 7; Merrills, supra note 7, at 169-81;
Shinkaretskaya, supra note 7.
106. CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THIRD PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 148 (1993);
Fitzmaurice, supra note 77, at 51 (addressing specifically the nonrecognition of actio
ppularisand the lack of right of standing for nonstate actors).
107. See BIRNIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 252-53 (2009);
Bilder, supra note 6, at 4.
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adjudication takes time and is often financially and politically
costly. A review of the main international adjudicatory bodies
illustrates these and other limitations.
1. InternationalCourt ofJustice.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is a permanent court
that provides legally binding decisions through judicial
settlement. 0 8 The ICJ Statute establishes that the Court is open to
the 185 member states of the United Nations' 09 and enjoys
universal subject-matter jurisdiction over disputes involving treaty
interpretations, questions of international law, facts leading to a
breach of an international obligation, and subsequent matters of
reparations."10 The ICJ assumes jurisdiction over contentious cases
by consent, whether express or implied, of the state parties."' It
may.also provide advisory opinions to recognized states as well as
the UN, its agencies, and organs." 2 Other parties have no recourse
to bring a claim before the ICJ."3
The ICJ is limited in its ability to effectively resolve cases
involving environmental issues for the following reasons. First, the
ICJ remains the venue of last resort for nations engaged in
interstate disputes." 4 States are reluctant to submit politically
sensitive matters to a binding process and the Court is reluctant to
overstep its judicial authority to decide such matters." 5 Second,
there are also concerns, particularly from developing nations,

108. MERRILLS, supra note 39, at 127.
109. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 34, 1 1, 59 Stat. 1055 (1945)
("Only states may be parties in cases before the Court."); id. art. 35, 1 1 ("The Court shall
be open to the states parties to the present Statute.").
110. Id. art. 36, 11 1-6.
111. For provisions on the ICJ's jurisdiction see id. arts. 34 & 36; see abso MERRILLS,
supra note 39, at 127-30 (noting that states may consent through a treaty or through
acceptance for legal matters according to the provisions specified in Art. 36(2)).
112. Statute of the International Court ofJustice arts. 65-68, 59 Stat. 1055 (1945).
113. See Dinah Shelton, 77Te Participation of Non-Governnental Organizations in
InternationalJudicialProceedings,88 AM.J. INT'L L. 611, 619-21 (1994).
114. BERCOVITCH & FRETTER, sulnua note 30, at 27 (noting that the ICJ has "heard
little more than one case for every year of its existence"); ROMANO, supra note 8, at 92
(also arguing for a more nuanced understanding about why and when states do not prefer
adjudication). For discussion about increasing the use and appeal of the ICJ, see
CHRISTINE CHINKIN ET AL., INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT

OFJUSTICE 42-76 (Connie Peck and Roy S. Lee eds., 1997).
115. For more about the judicial-political nature of disputes before the ICJ and their
justiciability see ROMANO, supra note 72, at 72-79.
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about the Court's lack of diversity and bias toward Western
paradigms of the adjudicatory process." 6 Third, the ICJ lacks the
capacity to consider all potential disputes over which it could
assume jurisdiction. From 1946-1997, the ICJ assumed jurisdiction
over 75 contentious cases (issuing 62 judgments) and 22 advisory
cases.' 1 7 Since 1997, the number of cases submitted to the ICJ has
grown in size, scope, and complexity. As ofJune 2011, the ICJ had
fifteen cases pending." 8 Fourth, when parties do submit a case to
the ICJ, proceedings are costly, slow, and often result in the
retroactive treatment of a harm that fails to provide a satisfactory
remedy.
The question of whether the ICJ is the most suitable forum for
adjudicating environmental disputes has arisen before, particularly
surrounding the establishment of the ICJ's Chamber of the Court
for Environmental Matters in 1993.119 Although no cases were
brought before the Chamber, which was discontinued in 2006,120
its development did prompt debate about whether environmental
disputes require a special international adjudicatory forum and the
dangers of distinguishing environmental disputes from general
international disputes.' 2 '
The following cases demonstrate challenges the ICJ has had in
treating environmental issues. 2 2 In the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project
case, where Hungary and Slovakia were at odds over a 1977 treaty
to construct a series of dams along the Danube River, the Court's
final judgment did not resolve the dispute. 2 3 Instead, the Court
116. See generally MICHELLE BURGIS, BOUNDARIES OF DISCOURSE IN THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (2009) (challenging the lack of third-world
representation at the ICJ and in international judicial institutions).
117. Int'l Ct. ofJustice, Introduction,51 INT'L CT.JUST. Y.B. 1, 3-7 (1997).
118. INT'L CT. OFJUSTICE, LIST OF CONTENTIOUS CASES, available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/index.php?pl=3&p2=3&sort=2&p3=0 (last visited, Apr. 12, 2011).
119. Sir Robert Jennings, Need for an Environmental Court?, 20 ENVIL. POL. & L. 313
(1992).
120. Fitzmaurice, supra note 77, at 54-55.
121. See E. Valencia-Ospina, The International Court of Justice and International
EnvironmentalLaw, 2 ASIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 1-10 (1992).
122. SeeBIRNIE ETAL., supra note 107, at 252-53 (showing thatjudicial settlement and
arbitration tend not to cater to the multilateral nature of certain environmental issues);
Andrew Strauss, Climate Change Litigation: Opening the Door to the InternationalCourt offustice,
in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE 334-56 (William Burns and Hari Osofsky eds., 2009)
(discussing the disadvantages of the ICJ as well as its advantages as a venue for litigating
climate change disputes).
123. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 74 (Sept. 25) (see
Part III.B for a description of the case and analysis of the Court's judgment).
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held that "Hungary and Slovakia must negotiate in good faith in
the light of the prevailing situation, and must take all necessary
measures to ensure the achievement of the objectives of the 1977
Treaty." 24 In other words, the Court chose not to dictate the
specific future conduct of the parties, but instead required the
parties to engage in mutual problem solving. 25 Similarly, in the
Fisheries jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v. Iceland), Fisheries
Jurisdiction Case (Spain v. Canada) and Fisheries jurisdiction Case
(Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland) the ICJ decided that the
parties must determine the substance of the environmental
standard to be followed.126 The ICJ held that the parties were
"under mutual obligations to undertake negotiation in good faith
for the equitable solution of their differences" '27 because "it is
implicit in the concept of preferential rights that negotiations are
required in order to define or delimit the extent of those rights . .
."128 Thus, the Court remanded responsibility for resolving the
underlying resource issues to the parties under their obligation to
monitor the marine-dwelling resources of that area and to work
together to adopt agreed upon measures for conservation and
equitable allocation.' 29
In these and other cases, the ICJ did not address the
environmental issues on the merits.o30 The Court has made
declarations that certain acts are contrary to international law;' 3'
decided whether a method of delimiting a fisheries zone is valid; 3 2
determined the violation of the sovereignty of a state over natural

124. Id. at 80.
125. Id.
126. Fisheries Jurisdiction, (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3 (July 25); Fisheries jurisdiction
(Spain v. Can.) 1998 I.C.J. 432 (Dec. 4); Fisheries Jurisdiction (Ger. v. Ice.) 1974 I.C.J. 175
(July 25).
127. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.) 1974 I.C.J. 3, 1 79 (July 25).
128. Id. f 74-75.
129. STEPHENS, supra note 62, at 73.
130. Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 93 (July 8); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
Advisory Opinion, 1996 1.C.J. 95 (July 8); Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v.
Austl.), 1990 I.C.J. 1, 241 (May 19); Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457 (Dec. 20);
Nuclear Tests: Application to Be Permitted to Intervene Under Article 62 (N.Z. v. Fr.),
1995 I.C.J. Pleadings (Aug. 24).
131. Ian Brownlie, Causes of Action in the Law of Nations, 1979 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 13
(1979).
132. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3 (July 25); Fisheries Jurisdiction
(Ger. v. Ice.),Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 175 (July 25).
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resources; 33 decided if a state failed to comply with international
environmental standards as a basis for state responsibility; 34 and
determined if there has been an unlawful confiscation,
destruction, or detention of property. 35 These examples
demonstrate that the ICJ's contribution to resolving complex,
environmental disputes is to clarify facts, decide matters of law,
and, at times, order parties to engage in further methods of
dispute resolution.
2. The Permanent Court of Arbitration.
The Permanent Court of Arbitration was established by treaty
in 1899 as an intergovernmental organization that provides dispute
resolution through arbitration as well as conciliation, fact-finding,
and inquiry.' 3 6 The PCA differs from the ICJ in that it allows claims
from nonstate actors where at least one party to the dispute is a
state, state-controlled entity, or international organization. It also
offers procedural rules for the arbitration and conciliation of
disputes relating to natural resources and the environment. 3 7
Parties commonly agree in advance through a treaty or other
international agreement that the outcome will be legally binding.
However, despite these advancements, the PCA remains
limited by its adjudicatory approach. 3 8 For example, in the Abyei
Arbitration, the Government of Sudan and the People's Liberation
Army of Sudan were engaged in a territorial dispute over boundary
demarcation as well as oil, water, and grazing rights.'3 9 The PCA

133. See, e.g., Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict,
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 93 (July 8); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 95 (July 8); Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v.
Austl.) 1989 I.C.J. 4 (May 19); Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457 (Dec. 20).
134. For additional treatment of the Doctrine on State Responsibility in reference to
environmental harms, see Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Report of the
InternationalLaw Commission, 53d Sess., at 43-59, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001); STEPHENS,
supra note 62, at 66.
135. See, e.g, Trail Smelter (Can. v. U.S.) 3 REPS. OF INT'L ARB. AWARDS 1905,
1911 (1941).
136. About Us, PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, http://www.pca-cpa.org/show
page.asp?pag-id=1027 (last visited April 14, 2011).
137. Rules of Procedure, PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, http://www.pcacpa.org/showpage.asp?pag-id=1 188 (last visited Apr. 19, 2011).
138. See Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes art. 16, July
29, 1899, available at www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/1899ENG.pdf (noting that arbitration
is the "most effective ... means of settling disputes which diplomacy has failed to settle").
139. Abyei (Gov't of Sudan v. Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army), 48
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divided the territory between the two parties by issuing new
boundaries. This effectively reduced the Abyei Area and
demarcated the oil fields to the territory belonging to the North.'*
The PCA's decision settled the legal matter but did not resolve the
underlying resource disputes. Instead, the PCA determined that
the parties were to take the next step, noting the need to develop a
"survey team to demarcate the Abyei Area as delimited by this
Award" and that "the Tribunal hopes that the spirit of
reconciliation and cooperation
visible throughout these
proceedings, particularly during the oral pleadings last April, will
continue to animate the Parties on this matter."l41
While the parties accepted the PCA's ruling, calling it
legitimate, transparent and fair, 42 they now bear the responsibility
for pursuing resolution through other means. The precise nature
and timing of these additional methods remain unspecified and
the underlying issues pertaining to oil, water, and grazing rights
remain unresolved. The failure of the final award to address these
outstanding issues and promote reconciliation was among the
critiques expressed by Judge Awn Shawkat Al-Khasawneh in his
dissenting opinion. 4 3
3. InternationalTribunalfor the Law of the Sea.
The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) was
established by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) as a permanent court with mandatory jurisdiction over

I.L.M. 1258 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2009). The parties signed the Arbitration Agreement on July
7, 2008 authorizing the referral of the dispute to the PCA for final and binding arbitration.
The PCA was to decide whether or not the Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC),
established by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), exceeded its mandate under
the CPA to delimit and demarcate an area identified as the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms.
The parties agreed in the Arbitration Agreement to authorize the PCA, upon a finding
that the Commission did exceed its mandate, to delimit and demarcate the area in
dispute. On January 9, 2005, the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation
Movement/Army entered into the CPA. Id.
140. Id.

141. Id.

769.

142. Id.
143. See id. 1 202 (Awn Shakat Al-Khasawneh, J., dissenting) (discussing the missed
opportunity for promoting true peace and reconciliation of the parties and noting that
"[i]nternational law and indeed law in general sometimes provide only simple recipes for
complex situations where populations and tribes intermingle and where the livelihood of
certain groups transcends borders").
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all State parties to UNCLOS."A ITLOS has experience with several
resource cases involving the seabed, marine resources and use of
international waters including the MOX Plant case, where Ireland
claimed the United Kingdom was in breach of the UNCLOS treaty
for failure to protect the ocean and the "Volga" case between the
Russian Federation and Australia over the conservation of fish.'45
UNCLOS mandates compulsory and binding third-party dispute
resolution through ITLOS, ICJ, or arbitration for disputes
pertaining to the application of the Convention. 4 6 However, when
disputes are taken up by ITLOS, the Tribunal's jurisdiction has not
always prevailed. For example, in Southern Bluefin Tuna, where
Australia and New Zealand brought a claim against Japan for
overfishing Bluefin tuna in the South Pacific, the Tribunal found
that it lacked jurisdiction over the case. This determination was
due to the fact that the 1993 Convention for the Conservation of
Southern Bluefin Tuna also governed the dispute, which frustrated
the compulsory dispute resolution provisions of article 28(1) of
UNCLOS.1 47 The Tribunal's ruling was based on its interpretation
that UNCLOS articles 279-282 afforded Japan the right to pursue
recourse under the preexisting convention, which required Japan's
consent to arbitration, thereby supplanting UNCLOS's compulsory
provisions.148

144. Fitzmaurice, supra note 77, at 145-46 (noting that ITLOS judges are required to
have competency in the field of the Law of the Sea); Sands, supra note 54, at 40-41.
145. MOX Plant (Ire. v. U.K), Order, I.T.L.OS. No. 6 (June 6, 2008), available at
http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/MOX%20Plant%200rder%2No.%206.pdf;
"Volga" Case (Russ. v. Austl.), I.T.L.O.S. No. 11 (December 23, 2002), available at
http://www.itios. org/cgi-bin/cases/case detail.pl?id=11&lang-en. For additional cases
involving natural resources before the Tribunal, see Land Reclamation by Singapore in
and Around the Straits ofJohor (Malay. v. Sing.), Case No. 12, Request for Provisional
Measures (Sept. 4, 2003), available at http://www.itios.org; Access to Information Under
Article 9 of the OSPAR Convention (Ir. v. U.K), Final Award (Perm. Ct. Arb.July 2, 2003),
42 I.L.M. 1118 (2003), 23 REPS. OF INT'L ARB. AWARDS 59 (2004); see also International
Envionmental Law in InternationalTribunals (Karen Lee ed.), in 5 INT'L ENVTL. REPS. 421,
421-44, 445-65 (2007).
146. UNCLOS art. 287, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention-agree
ments/texts/unclos/unclose.pdf; see MERRILLS, supra note 39, at 184-85 (discussing the
principle of compulsory settlement).
147. Southern Bluefin Tuna (Austl. & N.Z. v.Japan) 39 I.L.M. 1359 (2000).
148. UNCLOS art. 279-82, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention
see also YASUHIRO SHIGETA, INTERNATIONAL
agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf;
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 48-51 (2010).
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4. WTO & ICSD.
Disputes over resources and other environmental matters are
often raised in connection with trade and investment disputes.
There are two major forums for the adjudication of such disputes.
The first, the World Trade Organization's Dispute Settlement
Body (WTO DSB), administers settlement, consultations, and
panels for trade disputes occurring between its 153 State
members.' 49 Non-members, which include companies and
individuals, cannot directly bring claims before the WTO DSB.
The WTO DSB's subject-matter jurisdiction extends to all disputes
arising under WTO agreements.150 Disputes arising under these
agreements often include environmental and natural resource
issues. The difficulties arising from the WTO DSB's handling of
such crosscutting subject matter disputes are exposed in the TunaDolphincases and the Shrimp-Turtle cases.' 5s
A second forum for the resolution of international investment
disputes is the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID).15 2 ICSID sets forth procedural rules
for the arbitration and conciliation of investment disputes among
members to the Convention, which includes States as well as their
nationals (both individuals and companies).153 Although. ICSID
arbitration allows for the participation of nonstate actors, that

149. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
art. 3, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 2, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uraguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
150. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, A HANDBOOK ON THE WTO DIsPuTE
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 10 (2004) (including the WTO Agreement, 1994 GATT, and the
Agreement on TRIPS).
151. Report of the Panel, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT/DS21/R
(Sept. 3, 1991); Report of the Panel, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,
GATT/DS29/R (June 16, 1994); Report of the Panel, United States-Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,WT/DS58/R WT/DS58/AB/R (1998) (May 15, 1998);
see also STEPHENS, supra note 62, at 325-31 (discussing the implications of the TunaDolphin, Shrimp-Turtle I and II cases including the Appellate Body's finding that sea
turtles are "exhaustible natural resources").
152. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States arts. 25(1)-(2), Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (outlining the
scope of the ICSID's jurisdiction).
153. The Additional Facility Rules also allow for cases involving parties not
contracted to the Convention or cases involving non-investment issues. See Rules
Governing the Additional Facility for the Admin. of Proceedings by the Secretariat
of the Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes art. 2, available at,
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/facility/partA-article.htm (granting ICSID
jurisdiction over certain additional parties).
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participation is limited, as demonstrated in Biwater Guaff v.
Tanzania, where the Tribunal determined that the rules did not
empower States to permit the presence or participation of nongovernmental organizations.1 54
IV. WHERE ADJUDICATION FAILS

As discussed in Part III, this Article argues that source and
process limitations hinder the adjudication of international
resource disputes. This part considers four areas where these
limitations are evident: A) nonparticipation, B) failure to address
the issues, C) noncompliance, and D) recurrence. Although these
categories are not comprehensive, they do provide a basis for
observing the inadequacy of adjudication in this context.
A. Nonparticipation
Nonparticipation can be identified by cases in which parties
reject adjudication or refuse to participate. States are often
hesitant to submit politically sensitive cases to adjudicative bodies
because they have no control over the outcome.655 Courts can also
be reluctant to ask politically sensitive questions and thus become
reliant on the parties to present matters of fact. 56 There is "little
incentive to resort to adjudication as a way of clarifying or
developing general rules."15 7 The ICJ, PCA, and other courts do
not document cases of non-participation. Therefore, identifying
such cases requires studying the lifecycle of a dispute in order to

154. Biwater Gauff v. Tanz., I.C.S.I.D. No. ARB/05/22, Procedural Order No. 5, 2,
69-72 (Feb. 2007) (specifically analyzing Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rule 32(2));
see Kyla Tienhaara, Third Party Participation in Investment-Environment Disputes: Recent
Developments, 16 RECIEL 230 (2007) (noting that the non-state parties in Biwater Gauff v.
Tanzania were allowed to submit amicus briefs but were not permitted to attend hearings
or access unpublished documents without full permission of all the state parties); see also
PHILLIPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 144 n. 102 (2003).
155. See Stephen Gent and Megan Shannon, The Affectiveness of International
Arbitration and Adjudication: Getting Into a Bind, 72 J. POL. 366 (2010) (finding through an
empirical study that states do not submit to adjudication in cases where they believe there
is a high likelihood for an unfavorable outcome, but noting that adjudication is more
likely than nonbinding IDR methods to end territorial disputes because of this selection
bias and because legal principles enhance the credibility of the outcome mitigating noncompliance due to reputational costs and domestic political pressures).
156. Ian Brownlie, The PeacefulSettlement of InternationalDisputes, 8 CHINESEJ. INT'L L.

267, 281-82 (2009).
157. Richard Bilder, Some Limitations of Adjudication as an International Dispute
Settlement Technique, 23 VA.J. INT'L. L. 2, 5 (1982).
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determine when parties have dismissed adjudication as an IDR
approach.
Sometimes parties definitively reject adjudication. For
example, when negotiating the terms of the Indus River Treaty,
India and Pakistan decided against the use of arbitration. 5 8 They
have only used a third-party neutral from the Permanent Indus
Commission to facilitate the resolution of water disputes once in
the fifty years since they formed the agreement.15 9 In the Beagle
Channel Dispute, Argentina and Chile signed an agreement to
submit the dispute to the ICJ in 1964, but in 1967, Chile rejected
the use of the ICJ as a forum.160
In other cases, the parties explicitly agree not to use
adjudication or imply as much through practice. For example, in
the Mekong River Dispute between Thailand and Laos, the parties
did not include adjudication as a dispute resolution option under
their 1995 Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable
Development of the Mekong Basin.161 The river dispute was part of
a larger ongoing border dispute between the two nations and in
1995 the parties developed the Mekong Agreement, stating that
" [w] henever any difference or dispute may arise between two or
more

parties

to this Agreement

. . . the

[Mekong

River]

Commission shall first make every effort to resolve the issue .... In
the event the Commission is unable to resolve the difference or
dispute within a timely manner, the issue shall be referred to the
Governments" to resolve through negotiation, facilitation, or
mediation in accordance with the principles of international law. 6 2
This omission reflects the reluctance of the parties to use
adjudication. In the Amur River Dispute between China and Russia,

158. Indus Waters Treaty, India-Pak., Int'l Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, Sept. 19, 1960, 419 U.N.T.S. 125.
159. Mary Miner et al., Water Sharing Between India and Pakistan: A Critical E'valuation
of the Indus Water Treaty, 34 WATER INT'L 204, 207 (2009); PRISCOLI & WOLF, supra note 20,
at 190-91.
160. Lisa Lindsley, The Beagle Channel Settlement: Vatican Mediation Resolves a CentuyOld Dispute, 29 J. CHURCH & ST. 435, 437 (1987) (noting that in this case, the parties did
elect to use arbitration by a British panel several years later).
161. Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the
Mekong River Basin, 34 I.L.M. 864 (1995), available at http://www.mrcmekong.org/
agreement.95/agreement 95.htm; see also Kenyuan Zou, Transnational Cooperation for
Managing the Control of Environmental Dismites in East Asia, 16 J. ENvTL. L. 341, 345-47
(2004) (noting that only diplomatic and non-judicial dispute settlement mechanisms are
permitted per the 1995 Agreement between the parties).
162. Id. at arts. 34-35.
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at issue was the unclear boundary demarcation along a portion of
the Amur River and several islands.163 Although a legal questionRussia claimed that ownership rights were granted under the 1858
Treaty of Adigun and the 1860 Peking Treaty-the parties decided
against adjudication and chose to resolve the dispute through a
joint field-mapping exercise of the disputed area in which they
agreed to divide the islands in half.164 The parties were so satisfied
with this approach that they followed a similar arrangement in the
Argon River Dispute.165
B. Failureto Address Issue
This category includes cases that were submitted to court or
tribunal for adjudication but where the decision failed to
adequately resolve the resource dispute. The first example is the
ICJ's September 27, 1997 decision in the Gabcikovo-Nagpmaros
Project case.16 6 The decision did not address all the issues of the
dispute in a manner that led to a resolution.167 Specifically, the
Court did not address the future conduct of the parties with regard
to operating the existing dam or building additional ones. Instead,
the Court ordered the parties to cooperate on these endeavors.168
Slovakia and Hungary began negotiations on the implementation
of the ICJ Judgment in October 1997.169 Since that time they have
not reached agreement on the central issues (such as the amount
of water to be released into the riverbed and plans for the
Nagymaros Dam). 7 o The implementation of the ICJ's decision has
been slow and difficult and it is unclear if the ICJ will provide
helpful clarification that will prompt resolution should the parties'
cooperative efforts fail. Such unresolved issues and tensions leave
the potential for recurrence of the dispute.
A second example is the ongoing dispute between Guyana and
Suriname over their border. The first territory in dispute is the

163. GUo, supra note 31, at 45-47.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 50-51.
166. Refer to Part II.D.1 for a description of the case.
167. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.CJ. 7 (Sept. 25).
168. Id.; see also SCHWABACH, sufrra note 97, at 59 (describing the ICJ's decision and
noting the ICJ's recognition that the parties should seek an agreed upon solution within
the context of the Treaty).
169. Marcel Szabo, Gabcikovo-NagymarosDipute, 39 ENVTL. POL. & L. 97 (2009).
170. Id.
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New River Triangle area, a coastal region believed to be rich in gas
and oil.171 In 1969, Guyanese forces overpowered Surinamese
troops seeking to occupy the New River Triangle area and in 2000,
Suriname was allegedly preparing to retaliate with an invasion. 72
In a separate but related dispute over the maritime boundary,
Guyana unilaterally referred the case to arbitration proceedings
under UNCLOS, Annex VII. 73 In September 2007, the tribunal
awarded 65% of the disputed area of 31,600 square kilometers to
Guyana and affirmed Suriname's control over the mouth of the
Corentyne River.174 Subsequent actions by the parties suggest that
this decision did not resolve the dispute as tensions between the
parties remain.175 For example, in 2008 Suriname seized a
Guyanese ship on the Corentyne River.176
Third, in the Aegean Sea Dispute between Greece and Turkey at
issue was the ownership of a section of the Aegean Sea.' 7 7 On
August 25, 1976 the UN Security Council, in Resolution 395,
ordered the parties to negotiate and reach a successful
agreement.178 When negotiations failed, the ICJ assumed
jurisdiction over the case and on September 11, 1976 ruled that
the Aegean Sea was beyond the territorial waters of both States.179
The legal matter was decided, but tensions remained. Despite the
creation of the 1976 Bern Agreement's code of conduct governing
171. Jianjun Gao, Comments on Guyana v. Suriname, 8 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 191, 193
(2009).
172. Id. at 192-93; see also Christian Volkel, Tensions Resurface Between Guyana,
Suiname, GLOBAL INSIGHT (Feb. 18, 2010).
173. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 279-83, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397; see also Stephen Fietta, Guyana/Swiname, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 119, 120
(2008) (giving a detailed explanation of the events leading up to the arbitration and the
decision).
174. Gao, supra note 171, at 199 (noting that the Tribunal also held that Suriname's
2000 acts against the oil rig and drill ship constituted a threat of the use of force in
violation of UNCLOS, UN Charter and general international law and that both countries
breached their duties under UNCLOS in pursiance of a final delimitation agreement).
175. Volkel, supra note 172 (noting that the Guyanese Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Carolyn Rodrigues-Birkett, recently admonished the Surinamese government for its
alleged failure to assure that use of force is not an option).
176. Nervous Neighbors: Guyana and Suiname, STABROEK NEWS, Nov. 5, 2008, available
at http://www.stabroeknews.com/2008/guyana-review/ 11/05/nervous-neighbours-guyana
-and-suriname.
177. Guo, supra note 31, at42-43.
178. S.C. Res. 395, 1 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/395 (Aug. 25, 1976), available at http:/
/www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1976/scres76.htm (calling "upon the Governments of
Greece and Turkey to resume direct negotiations over their differences").
179. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1978 I.C.J. 3 (Dec. 19).
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future negotiations, this dispute is ongoing. 8 0
Similarly, the ICJ's decision in Land, Island and Maritime Frontier
Dispute concerning the border dispute between Honduras and El
Salvador, which resulted in war in 1969, has not led to the
resolution of the dispute or the finalization of the border
delimitation.' 8 '
C. Noncompliance
Noncompliance occurs when adjudication produces a decision
but one or more of the parties to the ,dispute rejects or fails to
implement it. A classic example of noncompliance in this context
is the Beagle Channel Dispute, which was also discussed as an
example of nonparticipation in Part IV.A. During the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, Argentina and Chile had an ongoing
dispute over who owned the set of islands at the tip of the
continent.'8 2 The owner would have claims to Atlantic territory,
marine resources, and potentially oil. In 1964, Argentina and Chile
signed an agreement to submit the dispute to the ICJ, but in 1967,
Chile negated its obligation.18 3 In 1971, after failed negotiations,
the parties agreed to submit the matter to a British arbitration
panel. The panel awarded the Beagle Channel islands to Chile in
1977. Argentina then rejected the award.184 Ultimately, under the
threat of war between the two countries, Pope John Paul II
facilitated a mediation process by the Vatican that successfully
resolved the dispute in 1985 by awarding the islands to Chile while
granting Argentina control over the Atlantic side. 8 5
D. Recurrence
Recurrence occurs when, after a period of relative inactivity, an
180. Bern Agreement between Turkey and Greece (Nov. 11, 1976), available at
http://www.turkishgreek.org/bern.htrn; Guo, supra note 31, at 42-43.
181. Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond.: Nicar.
intervening) 1992 I.C.J. 351 (Sept. 11); see also Manuel Orozco, Boundary Disputes in Central
America: Past Trends and Present Developments, 14 PENSAMIENTO PROPIO 105, 105-07 (2001)
(describing the history of this conflict and attempts to resolve it).
182. James Garrett, The Beagle Channel Dispute: Confrontation and Negotiation in the
Southern Cone, 27J. INTERAMER. STUD. & WORLD AFF. 81 (1985).

183. Lindsley, supra note 160, at 437.
184. Id.
185.

THOMAS PRINCEN, INTERMEDIARIES IN INTERNATIONAL CONFuCT 133-85 (1992)

(describing the Vatican's six-year mediation efforts that lead to the resolution of the
dispute).
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existing dispute or conflict returns. Between 1990 and 2007, 48%
of all international armed conflicts with at least 1000 deaths were
recurrence events where the prior conflict had ended no more
than five years earlier.1 86 Recurrence signals the limitations of
adjudication in the following ways. First, the slow pace of the
adjudicatory process frustrates the need to address in a timely
manner issues that lead to conflict. Second, even when a decision
or judgment is made, the failure to address the issues on the merits
in ways that resolve the dispute increases the risk that it will recur,
and often, escalate. Courts and tribunals do not track the lifecycle
of the dispute after the matter has been decided and there are no
comprehensive records about recurrence as a result of
adjudication. Lifecycle analysis of disputes, and the conflicts of
which they are a part, provides illustrative examples, but without
further empirical study, conclusions remain subject to additional
research in this area.
V. BEYOND ADJUDICATION: THE PROMISE OF INTEGRATED IDR
Parts III and IV have presented support for this Article's claim
that international adjudication is limited in its effectiveness as a
process for resolving international resource disputes. If this is
indeed the case, what alternatives might increase adjudication's
effectiveness in this context? This Part explores this question and,
in response, suggests that adjudication becomes more effective
when it is combined with interest-based IDR methods. Three case
studies illustrate the successful use of such integrated approaches
in resolving international resource disputes and the armed
interstate conflicts they were a part of. While not demonstrating
that this approach will always prove superior to adjudication alone,
these cases suggest a starting point worthy of further analysis.
A. Criteriafor Resolving InternationalResource Disputes
If adjudication is limited in its ability to resolve international
resource disputes, what type of dispute resolution process would
be more beneficial? Designing such a process first requires
recognizing several aspects that make these disputes challenging to

186. Lawrence Woocher, Preventing Violent Conflict: Assessing Progress, Meeting
Challenges, USIP SPECIAL REPORT 1, 5-6 n. 21, September 2009 (finding that 48% of all
conflicts and 30% of conflicts with at least 1000 battle-related deaths between 1990 and
2007 occurred in states where a conflict had ended no more than five years prior).
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address. International resource disputes are multi-faceted. They
involve social, cultural, political, and economic issues that raise
complex scientific questions,'8 7 and are often beyond the scope of
the law.' 88 They also involve diverse stakeholders, in part because
natural resources can cross a variety of geographical dimensions
and legal jurisdictions. 8 9
Addressing these types of disputes requires assessing the full
range of issues, needs, interests, and demands of the relevant
stakeholders.o90 Power imbalances, often arising from the unequal
allocation of resources, must also be taken into . account. 9 '
Resolving disputes over something as vital to human survival as
natural resources should incorporate those parties most affected
by the outcome.192 Increased participation by diverse actors
reshapes the discourse from legal rights over sovereignty and
territory to interest-based problem solving. It also places
responsibility of solving the problem on the parties involved and
not on a court or tribunal.
These dispute resolution approaches embody the principle of
subsidiarity,'9 3 which has proven valuable in a variety of contexts. 9 4
187. GARY C. BRYNER, FROM PROMISES TO PERFORMANCE:
ENVIRONMENTAL GOALS 4-5 (1997).

ACHIEVING GLOBAL

188. Stephen C. McCaffrey, Water Disputes Defined: Characteristics and Trends for
Resolving Then, in RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL WATER DISPUTES 86-88 (Int'l Bureau of
Perm. Ct. Arb. ed., 2003) (concluding that political tension is the "greatest single factor
responsible for increasing the severity and intractability of water disputes, and sometimes
even causing them").
189. See generally PRISCOLI & WOLF, supra note 20.
190. Id. at 101-02. See generally, UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT, BUREAU FOR ASIA AND THE NEAR EAST, RESOLVING WATER DISPUTES:
CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN THE UNITED STATES, THE NEAR EAST AND ASIA (Gail
Bingham et al. eds., 1994); Patricia Wouters, Universal and Regional Approaches to Resolving
International Water Disputes: What Lessans Learned from State Practice, in RESOLUTION OF
INTERNATIONAL WATER DISPUTES 111, 137 (2000).
191. For examples of effective international resource dispute management, see
PRISCOLI & WOLF, supra note 20, at 53-84 and BRIDGES OVER WATER: UNDERSTANDING
TRANSBOUNDARY

WATER

CONFLICT,

NEGOTIATION

AND

COOPERATION

85-96

(Ariel

Dinar et al. eds., 2007) (both providing case studies of the management of transbounday
water disputes that illustrate what criteria were effective in each context).
192. See PRISCOLI & WOLF, supra note 20, at 45; Harold H. Saunders, Interactive
Conflict Resolution: A View for Policy Makers on Making and Building Peace, in PAUL C. STERN &
DANIEL DRUCKMAN, INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION AFTER THE COLD WAR 251,
263-93 (2000) (introducing the concept of interactive conflict resolution and arguing that
for post-conflict situations, methods must aims to maximize participation at the right
levels); Brunnee & Toope supra note 82, at 4142.
193. ANNE MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 30 (2004) (defining subsidiarity
as "a principle of locating governance at the lowest possible level-that closest to the
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In his separate opinion in the Gablikovo-Aagymaros Project case, ICJ
Judge Weearmantry emphasized the importance of subsidiarity in
referencing local customary law and negotiation practices on
traditional water management in Bali as guidance for the case. 95 It
encourages diversity in settlement procedures and ensures the
availability of culturally and contextually appropriate practices.' 96
This in turn creates a flexible system capable of adapting to new
circumstances and avoiding undue constraint from legal
precedents that diverge from demographic and other realities. It
also helps mitigate regional differences between judicial forums
(for example, the EU's emphasis on compliance with the rule of
law through courts as compared to the ASEAN focus on nonjudicial dispute settlement) that highlight differences in normative
approaches. 9 7
B. EnhancingAdjudication Through Integrated1DR Approaches
Adjudication's many strengths are vital to international dispute
resolution. While this Article has argued that adjudication alone is
often an ineffective method for resolving international resource
disputes, this part explores how it may be more effective by
integrating it with other IDR methods.s98 Judicial settlement and
arbitration have different institutional and procedural structures
from mediation, conciliation, and facilitation. Integrating these
methods requires a more nuanced appreciation for the
individuals and groups affected by the rules and decisions adopted and enforced").
194. PRISCOLI & WOLF, sulpra note 20, at 3, 95, and 106 (discussing the need to keep
problem-solving local for effective management of water disputes); Greg Mills, Mission
Improbable, in CONUNDRUM: THE LIMITS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE SEARCH FOR

ALTERNATIVES 57-64 (Brett Schaefer ed., 2009). For an example of treaty language on
subsidiarity, see the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht (establishing the foundations of the
European Union, 1985 European Charter of Local Government, European Community
Treaty Protocol 30).
195. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.) 1997 I.C.J. 197 (Sept. 25),
7;
Id. (separate Opinion of Weeramantry, J.) It 88-119; see also Eyal Benvenisti, Asian
Traditions and Contenporay International Law on the Management of Natural Resources, 7
CHINESEJ. INT'L L. 273, 277 (2008).

196. See PRISCOLI & WoLF, supra note 20, at 3 (defining subsidiarity and discussing
how it informs cross-jurisdictional cooperation).
197. See Rosalyn Higgins, The IC, The EC], and the Integrity of International Law, 52
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 12-15 (2003) (discussing integration in the context of the
international judiciary).
198. For a definition and description of integrating IDR methods, see Anna Spain,
Integration Matters: Rethinking the Architecture of InternationalDispute Resolution, 32 U. PA. J.
INT'LL. 1 (2010).
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subcomponents of each and how they can be combined to achieve
superior results.
One benefit of integration is the complementary effects
achieved
by combining
rights-based
and interests-based
9
processes.'" Another benefit is that integrated approaches can
maximize stakeholder participation by incorporating traditionally
excluded parties (nonstate actors) into the process. International
judicial forums are not well suited to resolve multiparty complex
disputes. But mediation lacks a powerful and authoritative
framework for compelling participation and enforcing agreedupon resolutions. The answer is not to exalt one flawed process
over another but rather to integrate them into a mutually
reinforcing approach. Integrated approaches enjoy the flexibility
to consider a broad range of extra-legal issues deemed
inappropriate for a court. 200 Thus, combining subcomponents of
different IDR processes can result in new and more effective ways
to resolve disputes.2 0 '
C. Case Studies
The following three cases studies illustrate examples of
integrated IDR approaches that have successfully resolved
international resource disputes. These cases suggest that such
approaches are worthy of further study. They are a selection from
a comprehensive study of dispute resolution methods applied to
343 international conflicts occurring between 1945 and 2003.202 To

199. See Christine Chinkin, Alternative Dispute Resolution Under International Law, in
REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 123 (Malcolm Evans ed., 1998) (describing the benefits
of integrating non-binding dispute resolution methods (e.g., conciliation) into
environmental treaty compliance regimes); Mari Koyano, Effective Implementation of
International Environmental Agreements: Learning Lessons from the Danube Delta Conflict, in
PUBLIC INTEREST RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 259, 285-88 (Teruo Komori & Karel

Wellens eds., 2009) (using a case study of the Danube Delta Conflict to illustrate how
environmental conflict management and implementation of agreements apply the
combination of dispute resolution methods, specifically fact-finding and facilitation).
200. John S. Dryzek & Susan Hunter, Environmental Mediation for International
Problems, 31 INT'L STUD. Q. 87 (1987) (explaining why mediation is an effective method for
dealing with decentralized aspects of the global legal and political order).
201. See, e.g., Surya P. Subedi, WrO DisputeSettlement Mechanisms as a New Techniquefor
Settling Disputes in International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SETTLEMENT, supra note
77, at 173-90 (describing the WTO DSB mechanism as a blend of diplomacy negotiation,
mediation, arbitration, and adjudication that is "neither fully judicial nor completely a
non-judicial mechanism").
202. BERCOVITCH & FRETITER, supra note 30, at 8.
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mitigate selection bias, cases were selected that met the following
three criteria: a) international conflict b) involving a dispute over a
natural resource (land, water, mineral) 203 c) in which the case was
resolved. International conflicts were defined as those occurring
between States and involving actual military hostilities or
significant shows of force, 204 internationalized civil conflicts with
verifiable and significant international aspects, 205 militarized
disputes within a country that had the potential to threaten wider
regional or international peace and security, 206 and intense
political incidents. 207 Of the 343 international conflicts occurring
between 1945 and 2003, eleven cases were identified as
international resource conflicts, representing 3.2% of the total.
Resources were defined as water (rivers, lakes, waterways), minerals
(petroleum-based, uranium, other economically valuable ores) or
sea (fish, access to waterways, sea-floor/shelf).208
These cases offer a representative sample and do not purport
to prove that such approaches will work for all international
resource disputes. This study is not comprehensive nor does it
discount
examples
where
integrated
approaches
were
unsuccessful. These cases represent a small selection of
international conflicts involving natural resources based on the
stated restrictions. Additional territorial and boundary disputes
involving natural resources are not catalogued as resource
disputes. The study also did not catalog all types of natural
resources-for example, air or agriculture. The cases selected for
presentation in this Article are geographically restrictive so
inferences should not be attributed to the region or cultures
therein.

203. Many disputes over resources are primarily defined as political, territorial, or
boundary disputes.
204. BERCOVITCH & FRETTER, suna note 30, at 7-8.
205. Id. at 7 (defining internationalized civil conflict as a situation where a second
state or states become involved in a violent civil conflict through direct invasion or indirect
support of a faction within the country).
206. Id. at 8 (defining a military dispute as a military standoff between two or more
states that may or may not escalate into a war (e.g., Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962; Zambia
and Zaire in the early 1980s; United States and Cambodia in the Mayaguez Incident)).
207. Id. at 8 (defining political incidents as day-to-day diplomatic disputes that have
escalated to a more intense nature observed through political demonstrations, ultimatums,
or diplomatic insults that pose a threat to international peace and security).
208. Id. at 345-69. Resource disputes were identified from the total disputes by
selecting keywords "water," "oil" or "resource" in the Index.
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1. Mali-BurkinaFaso dispute.
The first example, In the Case Concerning Mali-Burkina Faso
Border Disputeinvolving Mali and Burkina Faso (Upper Volta under
British colonial rule), illustrates how the mixture of judicial
settlement, facilitation and mediation led to successful resolution
of the conflict and the underlying water dispute. 209
On December 14, 1974, Malian armed forces attacked the
armed forces of Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) leading to
intensified military operations on both sides. 210 The initial attack
was the result of underlying tensions that existed in the region
over a chain of pools sourced by the Beli River. These pools,
located along the border region between the two nations, are the
only source of fresh water in the region. Complicating the affair
was an ongoing dispute about the boundary demarcation created
by the French during colonialism.2 1 Ivory Coast, Senegal and
Guinea initiated mediation between the parties. The parties did
not reach an agreement. The President of the Organization of
African Unity (OAU) established a mediation commission to
secure the disputed territory and oversee troop withdrawal. On
June 18, 1975 the parties reached an agreement through
mediation by the presidents of the commission and the OAU. The
mediation agreement recommended an independent demarcation
of the frontier zone.212

Additional attempts to settle the dispute through negotiation
and mediation failed, leading to renewed tensions a decade later.
Lack of clarity over the border was a factor leading to the armed
conflict. The parties referred the matter, In the Case Concerning
Mali-Burkina Faso Border Dispute, to the ICJ. While the case was
pending, Burkina Faso sent troops and alleged census takers into
four villages in the disputed Agacher Strip border region.2 13
Interpreting the move as an act of aggression, Mali responded in
kind, sending armed forces to the region. War broke out on
December 25, 1985 and air attacks and ground battles took place
209. Id. at 77-78 and 92-93.
210. Id. at 78.
211. Id. at 92-93. Mali considered the area to be geographically and ethnically a part
of Mali. Burkina Faso contested this on the grounds that the area was demarcated as
belonging in their territory by the French colonial authorities.
212. Id. at 78.
213. Xiong Zhongqi, Roundup: Peaceful Settlement of Mali-Burkinabe Border DisputeGood Omen for Africa, XINHUA GENERAL OVERSEAS NEws SERVICE, Nairobi, Dec. 28, 1986.
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for five days. At least 400 people were killed. The group NonAggression and Defense Aid (NADA) facilitated an agreement
leading to a cease-fire and troop withdrawal. NADA members
continued mediation into January 1986. Meanwhile, the parties
awaited the ICJ's decision. In order to fully determine the border
area, the ICJ established a commission.2 14 The commission's
findings were included in the final judgment of January 18, 1986,
which granted the Beli region/Agacher Strip2 15 to Burkina Faso
and the village of Dioulouma and associated farming hamlets
(approximately 40% of the disputed area)216 to Mali.2 17
President Sankara of Burkina Faso acknowledged that dialogue
was a superior recourse to war for resolving the dispute and stated
his satisfaction with the commission's decision and his nation's
intent to honor it.218 The reaction from Mali underscored the
apparent legitimacy of the legal process through the ICJ, while
acknowledging the need for ongoing cooperation in the region to
address the water issues.
This case study illustrates an example of interstate armed
conflict driven, in part, by an underlying resource dispute. The
resource aspect of the dispute (access and use of water) was
resolved on the legal basis of territorial ownership. Resolution
relied on the clear demarcation of the border between the two
disputing states as well as continued cooperation to manage the
water resource. This case also demonstrates the complexity of
interstate resource disputes and highlights the need for dispute
resolution methods that can address legal and environmental
issues.
2. Cameroon-Nigeriaincident.219
The Cameroon-Nigeria Incident illustrates how the mixture of
judicial settlement and facilitation led to the successful resolution
of interstate armed conflict involving marine and oil resources. In

214. Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 1.C.J. 554 (Dec. 22).
215. Zhongqi, supra note 213 (stating that, according to local knowledge, the
Agacher Strip is believed to be rich in mineral resources, notably uranium and natural
gas).
216. Id.
217. Malian and Butkinabe Statement on ICJ Ruling on Border Dispute, BBC, Dec. 22,
1986 (text of statements made by Thomas Sankara, President, Burkina Faso).
218. Id.
219. BERCOVITCH & FRETTER, supra note 30, at 85.
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1994, conflict broke out between Cameroon and Nigeria over a
border dispute over the Bakassi peninsula that also involved
fishing rights and claims to offshore oil fields in the Gulf of
Guinea. 220 There were earlier border disputes in 1961 and 1981
that led to armed conflicts, which eventually ended through
mediation by President Daniel Moi of Kenya after negotiations
failed. In this incident, Cameroon agreed to compensate the
families of Nigerian soldiers killed in the fighting and both parties
agreed to establish an international arbitration panel to pursue
border delimitation.2 2 1
Despite these efforts, the fighting in 1994 continued
intermittently until 2000 when leaders from both countries met to
discuss peaceful resolution options. When direct negotiations
between the parties failed, they agreed to pursue recourse through
judicial settlement at the ICJ.2 22 President Biya of Cameroon
pledged to abide by the ICJ's ruling and, in anticipation of the
decision, said "[1]et the law be stated."2 23 In the ICJ's October
2002 decision, the Court found that Cameroon had sovereignty
over parts of the disputed area and delineated the undefined parts
of the border. 224 Then, a commission with representatives from
Cameroon, Nigeria, and the United States was set up to facilitate
the implementation of the ruling and Nigeria's release of thirtytwo villages to Cameroon.22 5 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was
instrumental in supporting the peace process. 2 26 Director-General
of the National Boundary Commission Alhaji Dahiru Bobbo said "
[t]he boundary is well-defined now. There is no ambiguity; and no
gendarmes should come and harass people there."2 27
In this case, the combination of adjudication by the ICJ,
facilitation by the commission, and the political support of the UN
220. Thomas Stauffer, West Africans Skirmish-Over Oil?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Mar. 22, 1994, at 1.
221. BERCOVITCH & FRETTER, supra note 30, at 85.
222. Bakassi Talks, LLOYD'S LIST,June 15, 1994, at 12.
223. Cameroon Calmly Awaits Verdict on Bakassi, PANAFRIcAN NEWS AGENcY, Oct. 10,
2002.
224. Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, 2002 I.C.J. 303
(Oct. 10); see also Lisa Schlein, Nigeria-CameroonDispute, FED. INFO. & NEWS DISPATCH, Jan.
31, 2004.
225. Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, 2002 I.C.J. 303
(Oct. 10).
226. Id.
227. Abdullahi Tasiu Abubakar, World Court Ruling: Cameroun Cedes Villages to Nigeria,
DAILY TRUST, Mar. 29, 2004, available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200403290514.html.
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were all components of a successful process that led to resolution
of the resource dispute and the armed conflict.
3. The Buraymi Oasis resource dispute228
The Buraymi Oasis Resource Dispute began when Saudi Arabia
and Oman both sought sovereignty and use of a border region
containing a freshwater oasis and land with potential oil reserves.
The disputed area had remained undemarcated since World War
I. In the 1940s, Oman began oil exploration in the area and Saudi
Arabia subsequently claimed sovereignty over it. Negotiations
between the two governments from 1949 to 1952 did not resolve
the dispute. Saudi Arabia sent a small military force to the area in
August 1952 and Oman responded in kind. Armed conflict was
avoided when the United States Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
intervened and a standstill agreement was reached on October 26,
1952. Continued aggression by both sides caused fatalities and led
to occupation by Oman and the United Kingdom An attempt to
arbitrate the dispute between 1954-55 failed, despite pressure from
the Arab League, when both parties withdrew from the process.
Negotiations remained ongoing. In 1959, the UN SecretaryGeneral engaged the parties in mediation, which deescalated
tensions and led the way for renewed diplomatic relations in 1963.
Military conflict ceased. The dispute remained ongoing until a
settlement agreement was reached in 1975 granting Oman
sovereignty over the area while apportioning land with potential
oil reserves and sea access to Saudi Arabia.2 29
Unlike the other two examples, adjudication was not employed
by the parties to reach resolution in this case. Instead, resolution
was achieved through an integrated IDR approach that utilized
negotiation and mediation. Mediation by the UN SecretaryGeneral was helpful in deescalating tensions and ultimately
allowed the resource dispute to be resolved through direct
negotiations by the parties. This case illustrates the importance of
recognizing that integrated IDR methods can achieve success even
when they do not include adjudication.

228. BERCOVITCH & FRETTER, supra note 30, at 268-69.
229. Id.
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D. Implications

Given the growing global demand for natural resources and
the reduced supply, understanding how to address resource
disputes effectively is vital. 230 These cases illustrate that resolving
international resource disputes is a complex endeavor, in part,
because of the interconnected nature of disputes and conflict. An
important underlying cause of the disputes in these examples was
the use and ownership of natural resources. Adjudication's
contribution to resolving these cases was to clarify facts and decide
matters of law. Resources were allocated on the basis of territorial
ownership and sovereignty. Although this approach is valuable
when addressing stationary resources that can be owned as a
function of territory, such as lakes and land, it proves less effective
at addressing transboundary resources that cannot be easily
owned, such as air and water. As such disputes increase and in
cases where limited resources must be shared between nations,
following an allocation approach based on sovereignty will not be
sufficient. Furthermore, because the nature of such natural
resources is dynamic, implementing court orders that are static
may be frustrated by changing circumstances. 23'
These case studies also illustrate how integrating adjudication
with facilitation or mediation can address the management and
use of the resources. Together, each process complements the
other in a manner that promotes resolution. The ICJ has said that
"the judicial settlement of international disputes, with a view to
which the Court has been established, is simply an alternative to
the direct and friendly settlement of such disputes between the
Parties .

..

; consequently it is for the Court to facilitate, so far as is

compatible with its Statute, such direct and friendly settlement." 32 2
This suggests that one role international courts and tribunals can
serve in the future is to coordinate, not merely encourage, the use
of additional forms of dispute resolution.23 3

230. ROMANO, sufnr note 8, at xliii (arguing that environmental problems are
increasingly the source of threats to international peace and security).
231. BRYNER, sun-a note 188, at 96-97.
232. SeeAerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pak. v. India), 1999 I.C.J. 119, 1 52 (June
21).
233. See, e.g., Territorial and Maritime Dispute Between Nicaragua and Honduras in
the Caribbean, 2007 I.C.J. 120, 108 (Oct. 8) (where the Court found that "the parties must
negotiate in good faith with a view to agreeing on the course of the delimitation line of
that portion of the territorial sea located between the endpoint of the land boundary . . .
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VI. CHALLENGES AND CONSEQUENCES

The international community cannot rely solely on
adjudication to resolve complex disputes that will arise in an era of
climate change. The obstacles to effective adjudication make other
methods of IDR worth exploring. This Article has suggested that
integrating IDR approaches offers one alternative for resolving
complex, multi-issue and multi-stakeholder cases. Whether
through integration or through other means, developing adequate
dispute resolution capacity is central to international law's ability
to safeguard global peace and security. However, as this section
explores, departing from the adjudication-centric model of
international dispute resolution challenges the traditional
foundations of international law in the following ways.
A. Sovereignty and the State-Centric System
The doctrine of state sovereignty has played an important role
in the development of international dispute resolution.
Sovereignty sets states up as the supreme actors in a hierarchical
international legal system. Sovereignty allows states to decide when
and where they choose to pursue dispute resolution. 234 Individuals
are treated as objects under the law, not subjects entitled to
enforce their own rights. As Lauterpacht stated "[a] wrong done
to the individual is a wrong done to his State."2 35 However, a statecentric international legal system has negative implications for
resolving international disputes. Under this model, nonstate actors
have no standing to contest a state's action or territory,2 36 and have
and the starting-point of the land boundary..."); Aerial Incident of 10 Aug. 1999 (Pak. v.
India), 1999 I.C.J. 119, 1 52 (June 21) (noting that "the judicial settlement of
international disputes, with a view to which the Court has been established, is simply an
alternative to the direct and friendly settlement Of such disputes between the Parties ... ;
consequently it is for the Court to facilitate, so far as is compatible with its Statute, such
direct and friendly settlement."); Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights
(Costa Rica v. Nicar.) 2009 I.C.J. 133 (July 13) (where the Court, in rendering its decision,
considered the interpretation of a key phrase "con objectos" by referring to an earlier
treaty as well as an ungratified agreement. This may indicate the Court's willingness to give
deference to the parties' intent as determined by earlier negotiations and consultations.).
234. "It is well established in international law that no State can, without its consent,
be compelled to submit its disputes with other States either to mediation or to arbitration,
or to any other kind of pacific settlement." Status of the Eastern Carelia, Advisory
Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 5, 1 33 (July 23).
235. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 71, at 154.
236. DAVID HELD, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-2 (2004)
(arguing that non-state actors thus often resorted to violent means to establish "effective
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limited ability to enforce their rights in international dispute
resolution forums. 23 7
The nature of international resource disputes demands a
different approach to IDR. Specifically, effective IDR requires the
inclusion of all relevant stakeholders in the process.23 8 Disputes
over resources reach to the core of human survival, invoking the
rights of individuals not just the nations that purport to represent
them. Therefore, assuming that states always represent individuals
or public interests is not appropriate.23 9 Nonstate actors need to
have a more prominent role in resolving disputes they are involved
in, particularly as the nature of international conflict is
increasingly shifting from the interstate to the intrastate context. 240
As individuals demand the right to enforce their rights and resolve
their own disputes, the IDR system needs to find ways to
24
accommodate this. 1
Opening the IDR system to allow for appropriate nonstate
actor participation and to promote non-judicial forms of IDR
alongside adjudication is a positive development for international
dispute resolution and, ultimately, for international law. However,
there is a tension between maintaining a state-centric system that
provides adjudication primarily to States and the growing need to

control" over the area of territory if they wanted to make a case for international
recognition).
237. CRAWFORD, supra note 92, at 35.
238. Kalas, supra note 78, at 192.
239.. Jonas Ebbesson, Public Participation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 681, 682-85 (Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnee, &
Ellen Hey eds., 2007) (discussing the development of international norms regarding
public participation for environmental matters in international law. "Governments have
lost the exclusive mandate . . . to represent the public . . . .").

240. SARKEES & WAYMAN, supra note 34, at 6, 562-66 fig. 7.6 (2010 Correlates of War
Project study, which categorizes and measures 655 armed conflicts between 1816 and 2007
resulting in at least 1000 deaths found that inter-state wars have been declining since
WWII, while intra-state wars have increased, particularly in the decade following the Cold
War); J. Joseph Hewitt, Trends in Global Conflict, 1946-2007, in PEACE AND CONFLICT 2008
21 (J. Joseph Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, & Ted Robert Gurr eds., 2010) (finding a
negative correlation between extra-state and intra-state war onsets and noting that as of
early 2008 there were 26 active armed conflicts in the world.); see also BERCOVITCH &
FRETrER, supra note 30, at 4-5 (discussing international conflicts occurring between 1945
and 2003).
241. For analysis of the territorial nature of subjects and on how to conceive of
political communities engaged in decision-making and other democratic ventures, see
Samantha Besson, Deliberative Democracy in the European Union, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
AND rrs DISCONTENTS 181 (Samantha Bessonet al. eds., 2006).
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provide an effective IDR system for all. 2 4 2 Maximizing the
participation of nonstate actors presents a challenge for
international courts. As this Article argues, adjudication is ill
equipped to address nonstate actors and extra-legal issues. Courts
and tribunals either do not provide for nonstate actor
participation or strictly limit the type and role. Non-judicial forms
of IDR, especially mediation and facilitation, generally avoid this
limitation because they are not subject to authority granted
through jurisdiction or other procedural constraints.
Moving beyond adjudication also raises concerns about
fragmentation, which is already an issue for international courts
and tribunals.2 4 3 For example, in the Tadic case, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia departed from the
earlier standard of effective control used by the ICJ in the Case
Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
2 4 4 If multiple courts may exert jurisdiction over the
Nicaragua.
same subjects or issues, and they issue findings that are
inconsistent with each other, this could fragment international
legal jurisprudence.2 4 5 Extending the international dispute
resolution model beyond adjudication may exacerbate concerns
about fragmentation and make developing a coherent IDR system
more challenging.
B. States, the InternationalCommunity, and the Scope ofInternational
Law
Resolving international resource disputes in an era of climate

242. See STEPHEN BELL & ANDREW HINDMOOR, RETHINKING GOVERNANCE: THE
CENTRALITY OF THE STATE IN MODERN SOCIETY 1-3 (2009) (arguing that state-centric

approaches are desirable because they are necessary for and strengthen governance).
243. See Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the
Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Rep. of the Int'l L. Comn'n, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/L.682 (Aug. 11, 2006); Y. SHANY, THE COMPETING JURISDICTIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (2003); Vaughn Lowe, Overlappingjurisdiction in
International Tibunals, 20 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 191 (1999); Tim Stephens, Multiple
InternationalCourts and the Fragmentationof InternationalEnvironmental Law, 25 AUSTL. Y.B.
INT'L L. 227 (2006).
244. Higgins, supra note 197, at 19.

245. Id. at 18 (noting (but disagreeing with) other findings of conflicting
international jurisprudence in: Loizidon v. Turkey, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep., 11 65-89 (1995), a
European Court of Human Rights case in which the Court and the I.C.J. differed on a

question regarding treaty reservations and Southern Bluefin Tuna (Australia & New Zealand
v. Japan), 1999 ITLOS 3-4, ITS cases in which an arbitral tribunal revoked -earlier
provisional measures granted by the Tribunal).
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change requires reconceptualizing the scope of international law.
While the foundations of the international legal system are
interstate, the future of international law lies in its ability to serve a
broader collection of global stakeholders. As nations and
communities strive to manage scarce resources, traditional notions
of property, territory, and sovereignty will be questioned. Efforts to
protect natural resources and the environment under
international law will need to follow a guiding principle of
collectivity. James Crawford describes this as having a
"responsibility to the international community as a whole." 2 4 6
Founded in Christian and natural law, this concept recognizes
international law's function as a protector and enforcer of
collective rights and interests.
The principle of collectivity is in tension with an international
legal system that prioritizes the interests of states. In many ways this
is a tension about whom the system should serve, especially when
the state's priorities clash with the public's. 24 7 This tension is
evident in definitive and ambiguous examples: instances where
international law limits powerful states in protection of collective
interests and cases where the international legal system prioritizes
state interests. 24 8
Climate change demands reconsidering what is at stake.
Solving problems that arise over natural resources in the
international sphere requires rethinking the distinction between
public and private cases. By their nature, resource disputes
implicate public interests,2 49 which demands broader participation
246. CRAWFORD, supra note 92, at 341.
247. See genetally Rudiger Wolfrum, Solidarity Amongst States: An Emerging Structural
Principle of InternationalLaw, 49 INDIANJ. INT'L L. 8 (2009) (providing a historical overview
on the concept of solidarity in international law).
248. SeeJose Alvarez, Contemporary InternationalLaw: An "Empireof Law" or the "Law of
Empire,"24 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 811 (2009) (describing the shift in international law from
a system based on the coexistence of nations to one of a new "'empire" defined as a
collective order that moves beyond statehood); Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, The Role of
InternationalForunis in the Advancement of Sustainable Development, 10 SUSTAINABLE DEv. L. &
POL'Y. 1 (2009) (discussing the collective nature of international law in sustainable
development). But see PHILLIPE SANDS, LAWLESS WORLD (2005); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Some
Reflections on Contemporary InternationalLaw and the Appeal to Universal Values: A Response to
Marti Koskennieni, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 131 (2005) (arguing that national interests trump
longer term international objectives because powerful nations maneuver against majority
aims as demonstrated by the tensions between U.S. unilateralism and E.U. multilateralism,
particularly pertaining to matters of terrorism during the past decade).
249. For discussion of this topic in the environmental security discourse, see SIMON
DALBY, ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY 183 (2002).
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in problem-solving processes. 25 0 As Trail Smelter and other cases
illustrate, international law has largely treated natural resource
problems as matters to be dealt with by and under the authority of
a state.2 5 ' If international law continues to perpetuate the
inaccurate notion that the state protects its internal subjects, how
will international courts and tribunals address states' failures to do
so? What will happen if adjudication cannot provide adequate or
speedy remedies to problems of human suffering? As IDR evolves
to address important questions such as these, it will necessarily
influence notions about the role and scope of international law.
VII. CONCLUSION

In an era of climate change, nations and individuals will face
difficult decisions about how to respond to a changing
environment and a world where there is not enough water, food or
oil. Will the rule of law prevail or will nations take up arms to
protect and to acquire limited resources? Such choices can lead to
unprecedented global cooperation or to war. Achieving
cooperation requires an international legal system capable of
overriding the specialized political interests of individual nations
in order to protect public interests. For the sake of international
solutions, States may have to submit national interests to the
interests of the global public. Preventing war requires an
international legal system capable of administering effective means
for resolving international disputes.
This Article has presented the limitations of adjudication as a
means for resolving international resource disputes. Specifically,
adjudication is hindered by the lack of adequate sources of

250. Neil A. Craik, Recalcitrant Reality and Chosen Idealv: The Public Function of Dispute
Settlement in InternationalEnvironmental Law, 10 CEO. J. INT'L ENvTL. L. REV. 551 (1998)
(discussing the need for dispute resolution mechanisms that are open to diverse
stakeholders, public in nature, and transparent).
251. Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 REPS. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 1905 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
1938 & 1941), available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_III/1905-1982.pdf
(weighing Canada's right to smelt ore in its territory against the U.S. right to harvest
apples and not be subject to damaging smoke from Canada, raising important questions
about the treatment of harms caused by private as opposed to public actors); see alsoJohn
H. Knox, The Flawed Trail Smelter Procedure: The Wrong Tribunal, the Wrong Parties, and the
Wrong Law, in TRANSBouNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 66 (Rebecca M. Bratspies &
Russell A. Miller eds., 2006); Austen L. Parrish, Sovereignty's Continuing Importance: Traces of
Trail Smelter in the International Law Governing Hazardous Waste Transport, in
TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 181, 183-86 (Rebecca M. Bratspies &
Russell A. Miller eds., 2006).
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international law pertaining to natural resources and the
limitations inherent in the process of adjudication itself. If
adjudication is going to play a constructive role in promoting
world peace in an era of climate change, it must evolve to allow for
increased participation and treatment of extra-legal issues. This
Article has suggested that one way to achieve this is to combine
adjudication with non-judicial forms of IDR in an integrated
manner. When we recognize the benefits of mediation and
facilitation, we can incorporate them in ways that complement the
existing international legal system. By increasing access to nonstate
actors and addressing extra-legal issues, adjudication contributes
to an effective international dispute resolution system. This, in
turn, strengthens international law's role in contributing to global
peace and security.

